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The core of a state is its physical presence and dominion over its land. States
are now battling to maintain their dignity as sovereigns, while traditional tools
essential to federalism risk erosion. Private actors, ostensibly empowered by the
federal government to condemn land through eminent domain, threaten state
sovereignty by attempting to take state property without consent. Select federal
statutes, such as the Natural Gas Act and Federal Power Act, grant eminent
domain power to private companies to take property for public use. Without proper
limiting principles, a statute granting such power could allow a private
corporation to condemn and take a state capitol—and the state would have no
recourse to respond. However, because takings must be effectuated through courts,
federal courts remain as a bulwark against improper intrusion into core sovereign
realms.
Where the private company seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain
and condemn state-owned land, how should courts evaluate a state’s defense of
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment? This Article traces the
independent but overlapping histories of state sovereign immunity and federal
eminent domain power. We argue that under current state sovereign immunity
doctrine, within the limited instances in which Congress has delegated its eminent
domain power to a private actor for a specified public use and just compensation,
the private actor is nonetheless prohibited from wielding that power to take state
lands, absent state consent. This Article ultimately concludes that a delegation of
eminent domain authority to a private actor does not abrogate or waive the
independent state power of sovereign immunity, therefore rendering private parties
unable to exercise eminent domain to take state property. Although intertwined,
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the separate and distinct history and evolution of delegated eminent domain and
sovereign immunity doctrines confirm that where they collide, state sovereign
immunity is still supreme.
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INTRODUCTION
Delegation is all around us. Congressional delegations of legislative power
comprise the backbone of the American administrative state. Setting aside
scholarly support of—or derision for—their magnitude and scope, delegations
are essential for modern government. Congress typically delegates its powers to
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federal executive agencies, but also maintains the power to delegate the federal
government’s power to private actors. Yet such transfers of power are not
unfettered, nor should they be. They are carefully circumscribed by countless
judicial doctrines that both define and limit their sweep: clear statement,
intelligible principle, and nondelegation provide some of the principal limits.
State sovereign immunity also limits these powers when private actors are the
recipients of great federal powers.
State sovereign immunity prevents unconsenting states from being sued by
private actors absent limited circumstances. Sovereign immunity is not just a
shield states may raise as a defense to liability. Rather, it precludes suits against
states altogether unless a state surrenders its immunity,1 such as through waiver,
forfeiture,2 or Congressional abrogation. And current doctrine severely curtails
when Congress may abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, largely limiting it to
Congressional powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Understood in context, state sovereign immunity operates outside of other
constitutional provisions and the Bill of Rights.3
It is an understatement to say that modern bureaucratic governance has
expanded beyond what the founders ever imagined, and courts must now
harmonize increasingly colliding constitutional provisions. This Article argues
that the text, structure, history, and background of federal eminent domain
power, as limited by the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and state sovereign
immunity are properly read separately, and where the provisions collide because
a private party attempts to take land from a sovereign state, courts should give
full force and effect to both provisions. State lands are within the core of
sovereign immunity. Further, Congress lacks the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity using its enumerated Article I powers. Thus, in the context
of eminent domain provisions, when Congress has delegated its takings power
to private actors, state sovereign immunity constrains the ability of delegees to
take states’ property without their consent.
Today, litigants who seek redress from governments have relatively few
options. Sovereign immunity has reached new heights such that the Court’s
aspiration in Marbury v. Madison, that there be a right for every remedy, has
become more of a whisper, if it ever was a true accounting. Official immunity in
tort against federal government officers overwhelmingly leaves litigants with no
1. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (“The Eleventh
Amendment does not exist solely in order to ‘preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be
paid out of a State’s treasury’ . . . it also serves to avoid ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties . . . .’”).
2. Waiver of sovereign immunity occurs when a state consents to suits by a private
litigant or class of litigants. By contrast, a state forfeits its immunity when it fails to properly
raise its sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional defense. For example, a state may forfeit its
sovereign immunity by removing a case from state to federal court.
3. The Eleventh Amendment both restores the operation of state sovereign immunity
prior to ratification of the Constitution and modifies the relationship of the Bill of Rights to
the states because of the later-in-time principle. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
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legal remedy; the combination of constitutional standing requirements,
heightened pleading standards and lack of respondeat superior liability
frequently prevents plaintiffs from any legal recourse at all.
The background and history of eminent domain is distinct but intertwined
with the evolving concept of state sovereign immunity.4 At least partially
instantiated by the Eleventh Amendment, state sovereign immunity existed prior
to the ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights.5 Although intertwined,
the separate and distinct history and evolution of each doctrine confirms that
where they collide, state sovereign immunity does not yield to eminent domain
power. This Article argues that under current state sovereign immunity doctrine,
within the limited instances in which Congress has delegated its eminent domain
power to a private actor for a specified public use and just compensation, the
private actor is nonetheless prohibited from wielding that power to take state
lands absent state consent. Further, without fully reconceiving the existing scope
of states’ sovereign immunity, Congress is unable to delegate its abrogation
power when its legislation is rooted in the Commerce Clause and other Article I
powers. While billions of dollars are at stake between infrastructure initiatives
and state public lands, the scope of the article is primarily doctrinal—examining
the balance of power between corporate interests and state dominion. This
Article does not advocate for the economic benefits of eminent domain or the
theoretical justifications of sovereign immunity, only that they must be analyzed
independently when the doctrines collide. In Part II, we briefly describe the
erratic legal history and doctrine of state sovereign immunity and federal eminent
domain powers. There, we show how each power evolved separately. In Part III,
we outline the limited caselaw confronting the problem of reconciling these two
fundamental aspects of sovereignty. Collisions have arisen when private parties
exercise eminent domain power under the Natural Gas Act and inverse
condemnation suits, where a private party seeks to sue a government for just
compensation after the government has taken land, and could arise under the
Federal Power Act. In Part IV, this Article examines how state sovereign
immunity and federal eminent domain collide, and how these independent
doctrines should be understood when they are in tension from Congressional
delegation of federal eminent domain authority to private actors. Finally, we
conclude with a brief description of the potential effects of resolving this tension
and a normative assessment of how laws where federal eminent domain power
4. Although there is significant scholarship on the collision between the Fifth
Amendment’s regulatory takings jurisprudence and state sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Eric
Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 493 (2006), there is scant exploration of the interplay between a private party’s
use of Fifth Amendment eminent domain power and state sovereign immunity. In part, these
doctrines do not collide frequently, because the courts have rarely had cause to examine the
narrow set of circumstances in which a private party seeks to condemn state-owned lands. This
Article begins that conversation.
5. As set out in Part II.B. below, the Eleventh Amendment does not comprise the whole
corpus of state sovereign immunity.
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is delegated to a private party should function.
I. BACKGROUND LAW
A. Eminent Domain in the United States
1. The Original Understanding of American Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for its own
use.6 Paradigmatically, this practice involves the government seizing private
property, and is a power many consider an inherent attribute of sovereignty.7
Under English common law, “land was owned by right of the king and that
individual ownership was merely a holding of the king in return for the
performance of duties and governmental functions.”8 Eminent domain was well
established in the American colonies by the time of independence,9 and was
understood to emanate to the sovereign from natural law.10 After independence,
when each colony became a sovereign state, the thirteen new states gained all the
attributes inherent in sovereignty.11 By nature of that sovereignty, each state
assumed control over the people and property within its jurisdiction which had
previously belonged to the king.12 That included each state’s right of eminent
domain. Much of this natural law understanding of eminent domain was then
constitutionalized.13 Eminent domain also flowed to the federal government as
its own sovereign, although in the early republic, there was some doubt whether
the federal government possessed eminent domain power because it had not been
specifically enumerated in the Constitution.14 Now this power is limited by the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which serves as a restriction on the federal

6. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1875).
7. See, e.g., Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) (“The power of
eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent State.”).
8. FREEMAN W. SHARP, LEGIS. REFERENCE SERV., DOC. NO. 406/112 A-201, FEDERAL
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A SOVEREIGN POWER WITH CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1
(1967).
9. Id. at 3.
10. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,
555 (1972).
11. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. at 480.
12. PHILIP NICHOLS, POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES WHICH AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE 3 (1909). Both the
public trust doctrine and state ownership of navigable riverbeds are born out of this same
principle. See generally id.
13. Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 555-56. Cf. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518, 3
S. Ct. 346, 350 (1883) (“The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed
the right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of
sovereignty, and . . . requires no constitutional recognition.”).
14. Sharp, supra note 8, at 6.
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government.15 The remainder of this Subpart traces recent historiography about
the federal government’s eminent domain power between the founding and
present day, and concludes with the current legal framework by which courts
consider delegations of federal eminent domain powers to private parties.16
There has been renewed academic debate about why the federal government
did not directly exercise federal eminent domain power until after the 1860s and
1870s, but it is nonetheless clear that in the period immediately following
ratification, “the exercise of federal eminent domain power within state borders
occurred generally in state proceedings and always with state legislative
involvement . . . .”17 There are four potential explanations given now for why the
federal government failed to exercise eminent domain prior to the 1870s: (1) the
federal government did not have the power to engage in such takings; (2) the
monetary cost associated with federal takings was too high; (3) the Enclave
Clause required that the federal government obtain consent prior to exercising
eminent domain power; or (4) the political cost of federal takings was too high.18
The following briefly recounts some of the possible original understandings of
federal eminent domain power, which will be instructive in understanding how
the founders may have understood the interaction between eminent domain and
sovereign immunity.
The first explanation of why the federal government did not use eminent
domain power in the early republic is because it simply lacked the power to
condemn land within other states’ jurisdiction. The federal government is one of
limited, enumerated powers, with the Constitution providing the initial grants of
power to each branch of government, reserving non-enumerated powers to the
states, while the Bill of Rights limits the powers of the federal government.
Eminent domain power is not explicitly provided in the Constitution, and
therefore, its original basis must be implied from the nature of sovereignty or the
structure of the Constitution; or was a background principle against which the

15. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.”). Although the text explicitly notes that takings of private property require
just compensation, the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to apply to public property
taken by the federal government. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
See also infra note 29.
16. This Article focuses specifically on the federal eminent domain power; however, it
is important to note that state delegations of eminent domain powers to private parties were
upheld as constitutional throughout the late 1800s. Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 517, 519, 545-46 (2009) (discussing the Mill Acts). Such delegations continue, and
are more common than federal delegations of this power.
17. Adam S. Grace, From the Lighthouses: How the First Federal Internal Improvement
Projects Created Precedent That Broadened the Commerce Clause, Shrunk the Takings
Clause, and Affected Early Nineteenth Century Constitutional Debate, 68 ALB. L. REV. 97,
140 (2004).
18. Christian R. Burset, The Messy History of the Federal Eminent Domain Power: A
Response to William Baude, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 187, 197-98 (2013) (setting out
historical theories and proposing an alternate explanation).

66

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 32:59

Constitution was crafted, and was only modified by the Takings Clause.19
Such a power could be inferred from three likely sources: the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or by the general
nature and structure of the Constitution.20 William Baude suggests that the
“original view was that the federal government had eminent domain power only
in the District of Columbia and the territories, where the Constitution expressly
granted it plenary power.”21 Rather than allowing Congress to exercise eminent
domain power by implication, through Congress’ enumerated powers, by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, or by negative inference to the Fifth Amendment,
Baude argues that the founders understood eminent domain power as too great
to allow the federal government to condemn land without express Constitutional
authorization.22
Baude has also argued that the modern Supreme Court understands the
Necessary and Proper Clause to limit implied powers,23 and that eminent domain
was a “great power” that could not be implied according to the Founders’
understanding.24 Certain delegations of power carry with them incidental powers
in order to effectuate the original delegation. As Baude explained, “when one
person delegated authority to another, courts frequently had to decide whether
the granted authority implicitly gave additional authority to help carry out the
grant. The doctrine generally provided that a ‘principal’ power carried with it
‘incidental’ powers, even if they were not enumerated.”25 However, a critical
determination of this greater-includes-the-lesser theory of delegation is that
certain “great” powers simply could not be implied because they would have
been enumerated if such a significant power was truly meant to be delegated
along with the original grant.
Analyzing historical evidence, Baude finds support for his argument that the
federal government did not understand itself as possessing a broad eminent
domain power. Baude’s evidence suggests that the federal government
condemned land using a cooperative federalism regime, in which it “relied on
the state’s condemnation authority—either by having the state condemn the land
and then transfer it to the federal government, or by having federal agents

19. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883) (“The provision found in the Fifth
Amendment to the federal Constitution, and in the Constitutions of the several States, for just
compensation for the property taken, is merely a limitation upon the use of the power. It is no
part of the power itself, but a condition upon which the power may be exercised.”).
20. These three sources were later discussed in Kohl v. United States. 91 U.S. 367, 37374 (1875).
21. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J.
1738, 1742 (2013).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1749 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592
(2012)).
24. Id. at 1749 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591).
25. Id. at 1750.
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proceed as plaintiffs under state condemnation law.”26 Shepherding legislative
documents during Senate debate of an 1864 railroad bill, Baude shows that many
were concerned about the impact to this federalist scheme if a statute were passed
to authorize eminent domain power.27
Scholars have set forth a second explanation for why the federal government
did not exercise eminent domain in the early years: because the costs associated
with obtaining the land and paying just compensation were too high for a federal
government with a limited budget. Until 1897, states were not bound by the
Takings Clause,28 and could exercise eminent domain power freely without
compensating private owners.29 In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co. v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court held that states were required to pay
just compensation for condemned private property,30 and in doing so made the
substance of the Takings Clause applicable to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.31 Prior to that extension, the federal government could
avoid its obligation to justly compensate for its condemnations by simply
persuading a state to undertake the condemnation for it.
Third, some have argued that the Enclave Clause limited the federal
government’s eminent domain power by requiring the federal government to
obtain state approval before exercising this power.32 This view is most
prominently argued by Adam Grace, and is predicated on his examination of the
lighthouse acts. Grace explained that it was clear to the founders that the federal
government could finance and build improvements to facilitate other federal
powers, such as permissible regulations of commerce. Because early commerce
was conducted heavily over water, some of the first federal improvements
commissioned by Congress after Constitutional ratification were for lighthouses,
which were constructed and operated using “virtually unquestioned” federal
authority.33 Along with this improvement typically requiring lands obtained via
eminent domain, the federal government “always sought a jurisdictional cession
over such lands from the state.”34 States often granted these cessions over lands,

26. Id. at 1762.
27. Id. at 1779-83.
28 See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (“We are of opinion that
the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the
exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the
legislation of the states.”).
29. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
30. Id.
31. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of takings,
eminent domain or just compensation, only that property may not be “deprived” without “due
process.”
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
33. Grace, supra note 17, at 101-02 (citing Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, ß 1, 1 Stat. 53
(1789)).
34. Id. at 143.
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but early state approvals often carried with them limits of federal condemnation
power.35 Yet he couches the common practice of Congress asking for state
permissions as required by the Enclave Clause, not the Takings Clause, arguing
that it was commonly known that the federal government could take private land
without state approval.36 Rather, Grace contends, the proper explanation about
why the practice was rarely utilized was political.37
Finally, responding to Baude in a student note, Christian Burset has
suggested that the federal government simply lacked the political capital with
states required to execute a federal takings.38 This political capital theory of the
federal relationship, then, mirrors larger debates about states’ rights in the preCivil War era. The nascent republic simply did not want to inflame the passions
of states and states’ rights advocates by engaging in activities which arguably
infringed upon a traditional state power. When approaching any condemnation,
the federal government would have to assess the state’s willingness to participate
and approve use of eminent domain power. Reconciling this theory, the political
capital idea is reflected in the fact that many early federal projects which
involved eminent domain power involved some version of cooperative
federalism, either with states being empowered with an Enclave Clause “veto”
or the ability to select the individual parcels of land which would later be
condemned for a project.39
The Railroad Acts are one of the federal government’s first major acts of
delegated eminent domain authority to private actors.40 A series of acts passed
through the 1860s, these were direct condemnations of private land, then granted
35. Id. at 143-44 (“If land was to be taken by the federal government, state mandated
procedures would have to be adhered to, including a requirement that all charges related to
the appraisement proceeding be paid by the United States.”) (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 147-48, 151 (“People understood long before the Kohl case that the states’
power to withhold consent under the Enclave Clause did not constitute a power to prevent
federal exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . . Not only does the Enclave Clause
empower states to impose limitations on the federal government’s acquisition of properties
where exclusive jurisdiction is desired, but if the federal government is going to obtain state
consent in any event, there is doubtless some benefit to having the takings issue ironed out at
the same time.”).
37. See generally Grace, supra note 17.
38. See generally Burset, supra note 18, at 197-98.
39. See infra Part II.A.2.
40. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 59-61 (2002). Much of the
federal government’s role in the construction of the western railroads was passive. Id. at 2.
States had previously delegated eminent domain power to private entities. See, e.g., Krithika
Ashok, Paul T. Babie & John v. Orth, Balancing Justice Needs and Private Property in
Constitutional Takings Provisions: A Comparative Assessment of India, Australia, and the
United States, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 999, 1031 (2019) (“From early in American history,
states had delegated the sovereign power of eminent domain to private companies engaged in
providing useful improvements, such as canals. But it was with the advent of the railroad that
delegation of the state’s power of compulsory acquisition became widespread. At first, the
delegation was in private acts of incorporation of individual railroads. Later, general railroad
laws granted all carriers the power of eminent domain . . . .”).
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to the railroads as an arm of the state, which then became private. In the normal
course, the federal government granted general eminent domain power to
construct a railroad, but the power was contingent on the state selecting the actual
parcels which would later be taken.41 Title did not pass to the railroad until after
the project was complete.42 Thus, consistent with the understanding of the
takings power at the time, federal eminent domain power could not be exercised
without state consent.
Georgia v. Chattanooga provides an interesting example. In 1837, Georgia
began efforts to build a railroad between Atlanta, Georgia and Chattanooga,
Tennessee. The Tennessee legislature approved Georgia’s purchase of the
necessary rights of way from the Georgia state line to Chattanooga, and eleven
acres for a terminal and rail yard within the city limits.43 In the years that
followed, Chattanooga grew and its business district became close to the rail
yard, leading the city to attempt exercising its eminent domain power over the
rail yard to extend city streets through the property.44 Georgia, however, asserted
sovereign immunity in Tennessee courts in response to the attempted
condemnation of its Tennessee property.45 The Supreme Court held that
Georgia’s “enterprise” outside of its territorial jurisdiction was a “private
undertaking,” and therefore the sovereign powers it possessed did not apply
because the role of the state had been transformed to that of a private actor.46
41. See, e.g., Kan. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 112 U.S.
414, 421 (1884).
The grant to the Kansas Pacific Company, by the act of 1862, carried the odd
sections within the limit of ten miles from its road, and by the act of 1864 such
sections within the limit of twenty miles. The act of 1862 is to be construed, as
already said, as though the larger number were originally inserted in it, and, with the
exceptions stated, it must be held to pass the title to the grantee as against the United
States, and against all persons not having acquired that title previous to the
amendment. The grant to Kansas, as stated, conferred only a right to select lands
beyond ten miles from the defendant’s road, upon certain contingencies. It gave no
title to indemnity lands in advance of their selection.
Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382, 386 (1876).
42. Ely, supra note 40, at 59. Although southern railroad development after the Civil
War was largely initiated and funded by the southern states without federal assistance, much
of the land used for the western railroads was federal land. Id. at 58. Federal land grants to
railroads were conditional on meeting stated conditions, and the railroads did not take title to
land from the federal government until they satisfied the conditions. As such, the legislation
frequently required railroads to forfeit infrastructure if conditions were not met, such as
completion of a project within a given timeframe. Id.
43. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 478 (1924). Georgia subsequently
leased its interest to a private company to operate the railroad. Id.
44. Id. at 478-79.
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 480-81 (“Land acquired by one State in another State is held subject to the laws
of the latter and to all the incidents of private ownership . . . . Tennessee by giving Georgia
permission to construct a line of railroad from the state boundary to Chattanooga did not
surrender any of its territory or give up any of its governmental power over the right of way
and other lands to be acquired by Georgia for railroad purposes. The sovereignty of Georgia
was not extended into Tennessee. Its enterprise in Tennessee is a private undertaking. It
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Thus, because the state had “divested itself of its sovereign character,” its
property could be taken in another state’s courts.47
Common practice changed in 1875 when the Supreme Court decided Kohl v.
United States, in which the federal government, acting in its own right, attempted
to condemn land in Cincinnati, Ohio so it could build and operate a federal
building housing a court, post office, custom house, and other services.48 After
the federal government initiated the condemnation action in federal court, private
landholders appealed to the Supreme Court, raising two arguments. First, the
private landowners argued that the federal government lacked jurisdiction to
effectuate a takings because the authorizing legislation required the state of Ohio
to cede jurisdiction over the site. Second, they asserted that the takings was
invalid because it exceeded the Congressionally-granted authority, which only
authorized “purchase” of land.49 Although the Court noted that the federal
government had yet to exercise its own eminent domain power, the Court
discussed three wells of authority for the power: (1) the Necessary and Proper
Clause; (2) the Takings Clause; and (3) inherent sovereign power.50 The Court
found that the federal government could take land so long as it paid just
compensation, and its failure to utilize the right previously did not mean that such
a right did not exist.51 Specifically, the Court determined that eminent domain is
a right of the federal government that “may be exercised within the States, so far
as is necessary to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution.”52
From 1875 until 1922, Takings Clause jurisprudence focused primarily on
direct federal or state government takings of a private landowner’s fee simple
interests.53 But with the Supreme Court’s decision in the landmark case
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, in which a state statute that restricted land use was
adjudicated a taking, takings jurisprudence was transformed.54 Subsequent
occupies the same position there as does a private corporation authorized to own and operate
a railroad; and, as to that property, it cannot claim sovereign privilege or immunity.”).
47. Id. at 482. See also Burbank v. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 62 (1875) (“When one State holds
lands within the limits of another State, it acquires its estate subject to all the incidents of
ordinary ownership.”).
48. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
49. Id. at 374.
50. Id. at 372-74.
51. Id. at 372-73; see also Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (eminent
domain “requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty. The clause
found in the Constitutions of the several States providing for just compensation for property
taken is a mere limitation upon the exercise of the right.”).
52. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875).
53. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 688 (5th ed. 2016). Regulatory takings
were not understood to constitute a taking until much later. Id. See also Shoemaker v. United
States, 147 U.S. 282, 321-22 (1893) (upholding the federal taking of private property to create
Rock Creek Park where precise tracts to be taken were selected by Senate-approved
commission).
54. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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decisions expanded takings doctrine, with much of the focus on regulatory
takings, and courts grappled with ensuing inverse condemnations.55 As Congress
expanded the federal government’s reach through the creation of new federal
agencies, particularly during the New Deal, federal delegations of eminent
domain authority to both the new agencies and private parties increased
significantly.
2. Delegated Eminent Domain Power
Today, it is unquestionable that the federal government itself can take private
land for public use so long as it pays just compensation. Much of the scholarship
and debate surrounding eminent domain focuses on what can or should constitute
“public use,” but it is nonetheless clear that eminent domain may be used for
building public works projects, such as roads, bridges, and many energy projects.
Some commentators have noted that judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause
has been remarkably void of historical analysis.56 It is equally clear that today,
the federal government may take land directly through legislation, as it did when
passing the Railroad Acts in the 1860s, although takings are more commonly
done through executive agencies or private actors to whom the federal
government has delegated its eminent domain power. This Subpart will detail
how eminent domain power may be, and has been, Congressionally delegated.57
The federal government may delegate eminent domain power to either
federal agencies58 or to private actors.59 States do not normally need to consent
to takings of private property within their jurisdiction when the federal
government directly exercises eminent domain.60 Where Congress has delegated
55. See infra Part III.C. In contrast to physical takings, in which a government actor
takes title to a property interest, a regulatory taking is government action which deprives a
property owner of all value. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Inverse condemnation is the claim which allows a private party to seek just compensation for
condemned property.
56. William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 803-05 (1995) (“Strikingly, even originalists do
not use history to interpret the Takings Clause.”).
57. Notwithstanding the problems that arise with both delegations of federal eminent
domain to federal agencies and private actors to condemn private lands, these issues do not
address the core question this Article attempts to answer: whether these delegations could ever
be used to take state land. As evidence, the authors have been unable to locate any case where
the federal government directly condemned state land against the state’s consent.
58. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 257. Some public entities with eminent domain power
delegated by Congress have also taken corporate form, such as the Tennessee Valley
Authority, or by states, such as many of the railroads. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for the
Incorporation of Railroad Companies, No. 82, Laws of Michigan, 1855 (repealed 1873).
59. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 240 n.10 (1946). Federal exercise of
jurisdiction over condemned properties within a state requires state consent. Id. (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17).
60. Nichols, supra note 12, at 24 (1909). And it is common for state legislatures to
delegate eminent domain power to private parties for public uses. U.S. GOV’T
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federal eminent domain power to federal agencies, the delegation must meet the
normal constitutional standards for a delegation, namely, the intelligible
principle test set out by J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, in which the
Court required Congress to establish a discernible principle proscribing how the
Executive would perform the delegated function.61 A similar principle exists for
private delegations.62
Where Congress has delegated eminent domain power to private actors,
those actors may be either private individuals or business entities.63 Private
delegations of public powers are often seen as problematic because they
frequently lack public accountability or appropriate oversight. Political
accountability is often understood as public accountability to an elected official,
or to a government official who ultimately answers to an elected official. Many
private delegations evade both public and political accountability; private actors
are not answerable to the general public, and what oversight exists is minimal.
Delegations of eminent domain power to private entities are atypical of most
private delegations, where the federal “government provides the funds, sets
programmatic goals and requirements, or enacts the regulatory scheme into
which private decision making is incorporated.”64 In a federal statute delegating
condemnation power to a private entity, the government sets out specific
regulatory conditions a private party must meet in order to take private land, and
qualified private parties apply to the federal regulatory body for licensing to
determine if the applicant meets the conditions set out by Congress.65
Private delegations of this traditionally sovereign power lack significant
public accountability. This power’s atypical nature does not make it fare any
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION ABOUT ITS USES AND
EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED 6 (Nov. 2006),
https://perma.cc/6XXP-RF48 (“State legislatures generally determine who may use eminent
domain by delegating eminent domain authority to state or quasi-public entities, such as
housing, transport, and urban renewal authorities, which may exercise that power only for the
purpose for which it was established.”).
61. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
62. There has been academic debate about whether a private delegation doctrine should
exist, which would be more restrictive than the nondelegation doctrine’s sole intelligible
principle test. Such a doctrine “assesses whether the Constitution’s separation of powers and
due process requirements prohibit the government from delegating certain types of powers to
private hands.” Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM L. REV. 1367, 1370
(2003); cf. Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, NonDelegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 931 (2010).
63. See, e.g., United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land in Village of Farmingdale, 43 F.
Supp. 561, 565 (E.D.N.Y.) (“The Congress may properly delegate to individuals or to
corporations power to condemn . . . to carry out its legislative intent.”), aff’d, 129 F.2d 678
(2d Cir. 1942).
64. Metzger, supra note 62, at 1395. These exist in numerous areas of traditional
governmental concern, with the outsourcing of the management and servicing of entitlements
to private companies as a primary example.
65. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f, described in greater detail in Part III.A
below.
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better when privately delegated, particularly when delegated without limitation.
In the case of the railroad acts, Congress, or more commonly the states
themselves, designated specific lands already owned by the designating
government to be granted to a private company, for a specifically identified use.66
Although these statutes are essentially private delegations, they were limited in
nature and scope, granting a single company a contract to build a railroad line
and take land along a broadly predetermined route. In the cases where direct
takings existed, members of Congress voted to approve the delineated taking.67
Where Congress delegates eminent domain to a private party, with oversight
placed in an executive agency, levels of accountability are further removed.
Today, any limited oversight power is commonly placed in independent or quasiindependent commissions, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which are insulated from political pressures that could provide
accountability.68 FERC, when fully seated, has five commissioners, appointed
by the president and confirmed by the Senate, who each serve for five-year
terms.69 The Commission is independent, and no more than three commissioners
of out five can be members of the same political party.70 Commissioners, even
when only three are sitting, may approve certificates conferring eminent domain
power on qualified private parties by a simple majority vote to construct natural
gas pipelines.71 Commissioners are not directly accountable to the president
because they may only be fired for cause and, because their terms do not
correspond to election cycles, Commissioners are often not appointed by the
sitting president.72 Further, there is less accountability for private actors
attempting to exercise eminent domain because takings oversight is bifurcated.
While the Commission may determine whether the private actor is statutorily
qualified to exercise eminent domain, private actors commonly must still take
title through court proceedings. While qualified private parties have the
jurisdictional choice to bring a condemnation action in state or federal court,
judges have extremely limited oversight.73 In this role, judges do not look beyond
66. See Ely, supra note 40, at 52-53.
67. See generally id.
68. The clash of powers at the heart of this Article is currently playing out in front of
FERC, which we focus on in more detail in Part III.A below.
69. Meet the Commissioners, FERC, https://perma.cc/SX4G-BP7W.
70. FERC, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018-2022, at vi (Sept. 2018), https://perma.cc/3X3CR7HW.
71. Three sitting FERC members constitute a quorum. McNamee leaving FERC; will
agency lose quorum? RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Jan. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/VR5FAVRS.
72. As an independent commission, FERC is subject to the “for cause” termination rules
set forth by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See also supra
notes 40, 40.
73. Condemnation courts have not permitted landowner challenges to the validity of the
Commission-issued certificate that grants the private party condemnation power; landowners
must raise such claims in a separate action on direct appeal to a circuit court. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 717f(h).
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Commission authorization and merely administer the procedural aspects of
condemnation, namely, fixing compensation.74
B. State Sovereign Immunity
1. History and Application of the Eleventh Amendment
“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
For such a terse admonition, the Eleventh Amendment has generated
outsized scholarly and judicial discussion. And legal scholars have extensively,
perhaps exhaustively, covered the legal history of state sovereign immunity,
which is neither defined by nor encapsulated within this succinct command.75
Sovereign immunity is the right of a sovereign to not be haled into court without
its consent.76 States enjoy an iteration of sovereign immunity barring suits by
private citizens absent their consent or, in some limited cases, when Congress
abrogates their sovereign immunity.77 However, state sovereign immunity does
not preclude federal government suits against them.78 Some conceptions of
sovereign immunity, discussed below, consider this akin to a jurisdictional
defense, which not only provides a defense to suit by a private party, but an
absolute immunity such that a case may not even be heard by a court.79 Exploring
the Eleventh Amendment’s history and function is a prerequisite to
understanding the federal government’s power to delegate eminent domain and
its clash with state sovereign immunity. Below we will briefly review its
checkered history as a prologue to examining its role when a private party wants
74. Const. Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 1.33 Acres in Delaware County,
N.Y., No. 314CV2034NAMRFT, 2015 WL 12559875, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)
(noting that courts do not look beyond the existence of the certificate).
75. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL, HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 914-22 (7th Ed. 2015).
76. Sovereign Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
77. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56 (1999).
78. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934).
79. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1963) (“As a
result of the eleventh amendment individuals could no longer sue a state eo nomine . . . . This
has meant that relief which in England was available only by petition of right could not be had
as a rule in this country without legislative consent.”); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *242 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001) (1765) (“[N]o
suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have
jurisdiction over him.”).
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to condemn land from a state.
Countless sources confirm that state sovereign immunity existed at the time
of ratification.80 For example, Alexander Hamilton famously described in the
Federalist Papers that the “plan of the convention” was to preserve States’ “preexisting” immunity from suit, because “inherent in the nature of [State]
sovereignty” is the freedom of a State “not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.”81
Shortly after ratification, the Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,
in which the state’s assertion of sovereign immunity did not bar a private
damages action brought against a state by a citizen of another state.82 Chisolm
has been repeatedly described by history as a “profound shock,” which spurred
quick political action to abrogate the decision: Congress passed the Eleventh
Amendment on March 4, 1794, and the states ratified it less than a year later.
Thus, if state sovereign immunity was not previously discernible from the
Constitution’s structure, the Eleventh Amendment overtly constitutionalized it.
Yet, the contours of state sovereign immunity remained unclear for nearly a
century, until Hans v. Louisiana first attempted to clarify its scope.83
In Hans, a Louisiana citizen sued the state of Louisiana to recover interest
on state-issued bonds. The suit was not textually prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment, which facially only precluded suits against states by citizens of
another state, but the Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.84
State sovereign immunity, as described in Hans, is part of the larger
constitutional scheme emanating from the text, structure, and history of the
Constitution.85 Although partially memorialized in the Eleventh Amendment,
80. Several scholars have recently recounted other writings by the founders at the time
of ratification. See, e.g., William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103
VA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2017) (describing how James Madison invoked Virginia’s sovereign
immunity when discussing Article III at the Virginia Convention); Bradford Clark, The
Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1838-62 (2010);
Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 61, 93-97 (1989).
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An Explanatory Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1270 (1998) (bolstering the idea that pre-existing state
sovereignty was inextricably linked with repayment of revolutionary war debts).
82. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 434-35 (1793).
83. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). There were unsuccessful efforts prior to Chisholm to codify the
concept of state sovereign immunity through legislative action. See Pfander, supra note 81, at
1279 (“the framers regarded the Eleventh Amendment as an ‘explanatory’ or ‘declaratory’
amendment . . . [which] sought to clarify the meaning of a law that a court had interpreted
(perhaps erroneously), and were often applied retroactively. By establishing an explanatory
rule of construction to govern the scope of the judicial power, the Eleventh Amendment swept
away all of the claims within its description, not just those filed after its effective date.”).
84. Id. at 1271.
85. 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (acknowledging the Eleventh Amendment was inapplicable
where a citizen sued their own state in federal court); Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional
Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2012) (describing state sovereign immunity
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Hans interpreted state sovereign immunity as the Court understood it to be at the
founding, declaring that “[t]he suability of a State, without its consent, was a
thing unknown to the law.”86 Thus, while the Hans Court read the Eleventh
Amendment as explicitly responding to Chisolm, it also understood the
amendment as representing and reasserting, a larger precept of federalism.
This extra-textual conception of state sovereign immunity not only
prevented suit by private citizens of foreign states but also prevented suit by
private citizens of the same state. Hans, in short, held that states possess
sovereign immunity such that they may not be sued by any private party without
their consent.87
A century later, the Supreme Court further defined the complex relationship
between sovereigns in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village.
Blatchford required the Court to examine whether states waived immunity from
suit by Indian tribes upon Constitutional ratification.88 The Court found that
states retained sovereign immunity against foreign sovereigns,89 even though
states consented to subject themselves to lawsuits by the federal government as
part of ratification in 1789.90 But, consent “to suit by the United States—at the
instance and under the control of responsible federal officers—is not consent to
suit by anyone whom the United States might select.”91
In Alden v. Maine, the Court found the logical conclusion of this conception
of state sovereign immunity, reemphasizing that the Eleventh Amendment did
not fully encapsulate the whole of state sovereign immunity.92 Alden’s holding
that sovereign immunity applies with equal force in suits against states brought
by private citizens in a state’s own court is best understood as an attempt to
reconcile and extend the full implications of Hans to all cases where a state’s
sovereign immunity may be at issue.93
as part of a “constitutional backdrop[].”).
86. 134 U.S. at 16.
87. Id. at 17, 20-21.
88. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781-82 (1991).
89. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
90. States “entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact,” and their limited
surrender of immunity encompassed “only two contexts: suits by sister States . . . and suits by
the United States.” Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782. See also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
755 (1999) (“In ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits brought by other States
or by the Federal Government.”).
91. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 785 (“We doubt, to begin with, that that sovereign exemption
can be delegated—even if one limits the permissibility of delegation (as respondents propose)
to persons on whose behalf the United States might sue. That consent, ‘inherent in the
convention,’ to suit by the United States—at the instance and under the control of responsible
federal officers—is not consent to suit by anyone whom the United States might select; and
even consent to suit by the United States for a particular person’s benefit is not consent to suit
by that person himself.”).
92. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13.
93. FALLON ET AL., supra note 10, at 443 (7th Ed. 2015) (“Rather than suggesting a
general qualification of the rule against discrimination, however, Alden may be best
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This is not to suggest that no remedy exists when a private party has a claim
against state governments. Of course, private individuals may sue state officers
for unconstitutional or illegal acts, but there is a fundamental difference between
suits against a state and suits against state officers.94 Although other forms of
immunity may attach where a suit is against a state officer, only states may
invoke state sovereign immunity. In Alabama v. Pugh, for example, current and
former inmates of Alabama prisons sued the state, its corrections board, and
several Alabama officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations.95 There, the
Court dismissed the state and corrections board, but allowed the action to proceed
against the state officers.96 For the purposes of successfully asserting state
sovereign immunity, the form of requested relief is immaterial, whether it is
monetary, injunctive or otherwise.97 Rather, the operative question is the nature
of the action.
Although not explicitly part of modern sovereign immunity doctrine, some
have understood the relevant inquiry driving whether a state may avail itself of
sovereign immunity to be whether the state wrongfully acquired title to the
property. As Louis Jaffe observed, cases are seen to be against the state, even
where they are brought in the name of an officer, in areas “involving the
enforcement of contracts, treasury liability for tort, and the adjudication of
interests in property which has come unsullied by tort into the bosom of the
government.”98 Thus, when asserting an action in tort, there additionally exists a
fundamental distinction between property that wrongfully came into the
possession of the government, and that which came into the government
“unsullied.”
Today, although scholars have identified other possible understandings of
state sovereign immunity,99 the Supreme Court has principally adopted a
Constitutional view, exemplified by the majorities in Blatchford, Seminole Tribe,
understood as limited to cases involving state sovereign immunity, a doctrine to which the
Court is strongly committed, and as reflecting the Court’s desire to address what it viewed as
an effort to make an end run around the doctrine.”). See generally Jaffe, supra note 10.
94. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
95. 438 U.S. 781, 781 (1978).
96. Id. at 782.
97. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 90 n.358 (1988) (“Injunctive relief will not necessarily
avoid a sovereign immunity bar, however, especially where the government has expressly
provided a limited monetary remedy and no claim of constitutional or federal statutory
violation is made.”).
98. Jaffe, supra note 10, at 29.
99. In addition to the constitutional view advanced in Alden, scholars have identified
three other primary ways to interpret the Eleventh Amendment: (1) a literal reading which
limits sovereign immunity to the text of the Eleventh Amendment; (2) sovereign immunity as
a form of diversity jurisdiction, embodied by the Eleventh Amendment, which stripped one of
the original grants of diversity jurisdiction in Article III; (3) a federal common law-style view,
which allows Congress to waive state sovereign immunity for a state where a statue exists. See
generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 75, at 914-22.
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and Alden. The majority in Seminole Tribe understood that the pure text of the
Eleventh Amendment did not capture the full weight of the immunity states
retained as sovereigns in the new constitutional scheme.100 There, the Court
reiterated that sovereign immunity is often absolute, and does not depend on the
structure of the suit or remedy sought.101 State real property falls well within the
core of state dignity, and thus the core of sovereign immunity doctrine. Suability
could not be altered or abrogated except through special powers, not realized
until the reconstruction amendments. Rather, sovereign immunity is inherent in
the constitutional scheme, and the Amendment’s text is simply a reaction
correcting for the wrongly decided Chisolm.102
It is well established that private litigants may not sue states without their
consent for damages, where liability may require drawing on the state fisk, but
may engage in suits where regulatory takings are at issue, when a state regulation
limits a property’s use thereby diminishing its value. However, it is entirely
different when a private party, empowered by the federal government to
condemn land, attempts to exercise that delegated power against an unconsenting
state.
It bears noting what the Court has identified as the core attributes of
sovereignty, in order to better understand what would impinge on state
sovereignty. For the Alden Court, state dignity was a paramount sovereign
interest, which included the ability of a state to craft and enforce its own laws,
and not be haled into court by another sovereign.103 This rationale also formed
the basis of Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority, in which a federal agency attempted to assert jurisdiction over an arm
of the state of South Carolina, to hear a private claim.104 There, garnering a 5-4
decision, the Court held that the state was entitled to sovereign immunity because
it was the “type of proceeding[] from which the Framers would have thought the
States possessed immunity when they agreed to enter the Union.”105
Although state revolutionary war debts seem to have been the primary driver
of state sovereign immunity at the founding, in the modern doctrine, state dignity
has since displaced debts as the primary concern.106 The dignity interests
100. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70-74 (1996).
101. Id. at 58 (“[The] type of relief sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power
to abrogate States’ immunity . . . . ‘[I]t also serves to avoid “the indignity of subjecting a State
to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties . . . .’’’ (quoting
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993))).
102. Id. at 73.
103. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-49 (1999); accord Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44
at 58.
104. 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (holding state sovereign immunity precluded a federal
administrative agency from adjudicating a private claim jurisdiction where the state did not
consent).
105. Id. at 756.
106. Id. at 769 (“[T]he primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State
treasuries, . . . but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.”); see
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afforded to states grew out of those afforded to sovereign persons, i.e., kings and
queens,107 however they are now applied to states as sovereigns in their own
right.108
In Allen v. Cooper, the Court advanced Alden’s conception of state sovereign
immunity. The Allen Court held that the Constitution’s Copyright Clause,
Article I § 8, did not give Congress the power to validly abrogate state sovereign
immunity.109 Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, reiterated that in
Seminole Tribe, “the Court had held that ‘Article I cannot be used to circumvent’
the limits sovereign immunity ‘place[s] upon federal jurisdiction.”110 Justice
Kagan made further efforts to cement the Court’s previous sovereign immunity
caselaw, noting that the Court “demand[s] a ‘special justification,’ over and
above the belief ‘that the precedent was wrongly decided.’”111 Thus, despite the
fact that petitioner Allen argued for a somewhat novel position, it was abundantly
clear to the Court that the question before it had already been decided.
2. Permissible Suits against States by Private Parties
“The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting
States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.”112
a.

Eleventh Amendment Exceptions

There are three situations in which a state directly may be sued in federal
court: (1) the state has waived its sovereign immunity;113 (2) the federal
government or another state sues the state;114 or (3) Congress has abrogated state
generally Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1, 51-75 (2003).
107. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1957 (2003). The shift
to emphasize state dignity interests in modern doctrine has been criticized in recent scholarship
as ahistorical. See Corey Brettschneider & David McNamee, Sovereign and State: A
Democratic Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1229, 1252-66; Peter J. Smith,
States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2003)
(arguing there is a dubious connection between the law of nations concept of state dignity and
state sovereign immunity).
108. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, U. PENN. L. REV. 169, 190199 (2011) (characterizing the history of state dignity).
109. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002 (2020).
110. 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002 (2020) (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73).
111. Id. at 1003 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266
(2014)).
112. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
113. Wis. Dept. of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (“[T]he Eleventh
Amendment grants the State a legal power to assert a sovereign immunity defense should it
choose to do so . . . . Unless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it.”).
114. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (“We have
hitherto found a surrender of immunity against particular litigants in only two contexts: suits
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sovereign immunity in a statute grounded in Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment by using a “clear statement.”115 Notwithstanding these three specific
scenarios, there are a few other narrowly defined exceptions to sovereign
immunity’s bar, such as officer suits,116 or instances where sovereign immunity
is simply inapplicable, as in suits against local or municipal officials.117
A brief review of these principal scenarios helps to elucidate sovereignty’s
outer boundaries. First, states are not obligated to invoke sovereign immunity as
a defense from suit, and unlike federal subject matter jurisdiction, may choose to
waive the defense.118 Blanket waivers are frequent, and range from citizen suit
provisions, allowing a certain class to bring a claim against the state for failure
to enforce a certain law or for tort claims to recover damages, which provide a
defined mechanism to recover liability from the sovereign. Citizen suits
provisions against a state’s action are prime examples of blanket sovereign
immunity waivers. Second, states cannot assert sovereign immunity in response
to a suit by the United States or another state in a federal forum.119 These limits
help define the relationships between co-equal sovereigns and the basic
underpinnings of our federal-state government.120 Finally, the Court has found
that while Congress typically “lacks power . . . to abrogate the States’ sovereign

by sister States, and suits by the United States.”) (internal citations omitted).
115. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (“the
Eleventh Amendment is ‘necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,’ that is, by Congress’ power ‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ As a result, when acting pursuant
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without
the States’ consent.” (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976))).
116. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). These may be appropriately
described as fictions, rather than exceptions.
117. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977) (state sovereign immunity does not apply to municipalities).
118. FALLON ET AL., supra note 75, at 919-20 (describing the view that the Eleventh
Amendment created a non-waivable subject matter immunity “in cases within the terms of its
specific text”).
119. In an interesting originalist wrinkle, recently the Court allowed suit against one
state in another state’s courts. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019). This
was justified on the broad ground, according to the Court, that states had the option of granting
sovereign immunity to other states as litigants in their own courts. This history has been
challenged, see Brief of Professors William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs as Amici Curiae In
Support of Neither Party, Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019)
(No. 17-1299), but the Court discussed the advantages of reciprocity of sovereign immunity,
as it exists on the international stage, rather than a mandatory recognition of another sister
state’s sovereignty.
120. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733-34 (1999) (Congress’ limited ability to
abrogate that immunity applies equally in state courts). See also FALLON ET AL., supra note 75,
at 757 (“state sovereign immunity does not derive simply from the Eleventh Amendment . . .
but rather is embedded in the Constitution and is generally co-extensive in state and federal
courts.”); Richard H. Seamon, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts, 37
BRANDEIS L. J. 319, 355 n.175 (1998) (noting that Congress only has power to authorize but
cannot force jurisdiction in state courts).

February 2021]

TAKING FROM STATES

81

immunity,”121 exercises of this power are valid under the enforcement clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.122 Yet, even where Congressional power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity exists, this power is not without significant limits. For
example, Congressional abrogation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, still presumes that abrogation of state sovereign immunity operates
as a concrete and proportional remedy to an identified pattern of constitutional
violations.123
While other, untested Constitutional provisions could serve as independent
sources of Congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the
Commerce Clause is clearly not what the court requires as a “valid exercise of
power.”124 Justice Scalia noted in his Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. dissent that
“[f]orty-nine Congresses since Hans have legislated under [the] assurance” that
the Commerce Clause could not give rise to private damages actions against
States.125 Therefore, “[i]t is impossible to say how many extant statutes would
have included an explicit preclusion of suits against States if it had not been
thought that such suits were automatically barred.”126 After Seminole Tribe
overruled Union Gas,127 the Court made clear that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its exercise of the commerce power.128

121. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000).
122. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). But see Reconciling State Sovereign
Immunity with the Fourteenth Amendment, Note, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1088-89 n.133
(2016) (suggesting that Florida Prepaid does not impose limits on Congress’ Fourteenth
Amendment abrogation power).
123. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 636 (1999) (holding that Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity was not
concrete and proportional to an alleged due process violation, as required by City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). The Court has yet to rule on what constitutional provisions may
enable Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. For example, although the Court has
previously understood the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment to operate in
tandem to the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such that Congress could
likely validly abrogate state sovereign immunity against racial vote denial cases, this theory
has not been tested.
124. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
125. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 35 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 45 (1996).
126. Id. Justice Scalia went further to speculate that the form of constitutional
amendments would be different had the drafters and states known that state treasuries could
be impacted by private damages suits.
127. 491 U.S. 1. For a short period after Union Gas, Congress mistakenly acted on the
assumption it could abrogate state sovereign immunity based on the interstate commerce
power. However, Seminole Tribe held Union Gas was wrongly decided and that Congress
could not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the interstate or Indian
commerce clauses. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45.
128. While Katz reaffirmed Seminole Tribe in that Congress could not abrogate state
sovereign immunity using the Indian or Interstate Commerce Clauses, Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v.
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006), it found that the original understanding of the Bankruptcy
Clause, although an Art. I power, was distinct such that Congress could validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity, id. at 368-78 This indicates that other Article I powers may have
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Crucially, in 2020 Allen v. Cooper rejected a “clause-by-clause” approach to
determining whether a portion of Article I allows Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.129 Instead, it held that the Bankruptcy Clause stands apart
due to its unique history.130 Thus, while the caselaw is relatively limited as to
constitutionally permissible mechanisms for abrogating or avoiding sovereign
immunity claims, the last century is fairly clear about their narrow contours.
b. The Clear Statement Canon of Federalism
In the limited circumstances where the Court finds that Congress may validly
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, the question remains whether Congress
has actually done so. As with many questions relating to federalism, it is
generally accepted that the clear statement canon of federalism applies to
determine whether an abrogation has occurred.131 Thus, when the federal
government attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity, courts will carefully
consider whether abrogation is permissible, because it has a significant potential
to upset the delicate balance of federalism.132
The clear statement rules are canons of textual interpretation whereby,
generally speaking, courts “insist that Congress speak with unusual clarity when
it wishes to effect a result that, although constitutional, would disturb a
constitutionally inspired value.”133 The clear statement rules apply whenever
Congress intends to alter the traditional balance between state and federal
powers.134 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, the Court held that Congress
must make its intention “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” in
order to abrogate the basic sovereign immunity that states retain against suits by
private actors.135 This test has come to be called the “unmistakably clear” or
sufficient original purposes such that Congress could validly abrogate state sovereign
immunity using a clear statement. But see Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002-03 (2019)
(rejecting other Article I abrogation power claims).
129. 140 S. Ct. at 1003-04 (2020).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547
(1985) (the clear statement rule exists because “[s]tates occupy a special and specific position
in our constitutional system.”); John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 401 (2010) (“the Court gives effect to the value of dual sovereignty
by enforcing federalism clear statement rules, to the value of nonretroactivity by presuming
that new civil liabilities apply prospectively, and to rule-of-law values by adopting a strong
presumption of reviewability of administrative action.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
132. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1001 (“Not even the most crystalline abrogation can take effect
unless it is ‘a valid exercise of constitutional authority.’” (quoting Kimel, 528 U. S. 62, 78
(2000))).
133. Id. at 406; John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2027 n.101 (2009).
134. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
135. 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (concerning a private citizen attempting to sue the State
of California in federal court under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.), superseded by Congress,
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“clear statement” test.136
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court elaborated on this basic clear
statement tenet in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. There, the Court
declared that, “Congress should make its intention ‘clear and manifest’ if it
intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States . . . .”137 These historic
powers included those affecting the “federal balance.” Applying this logic, the
Will court held that Congress did not intend to abrogate state sovereign immunity
with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it contained no clear statement explicitly
evidencing that intent.138 Thus, the Court read Section 1983 to apply only to the
actions of state officers, not a state itself.139 This basic logic applies both in and
outside of the Eleventh Amendment context, to any Congressional act limiting a
state from prospectively asserting its sovereign immunity.140
Similarly, in Dellmuth v. Muth, the Court limited the permissible sources for
discerning whether an abrogation of state sovereign immunity had actually
occurred, stating that
[l]egislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether
Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress’ intention
is ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’ recourse to legislative
history will be unnecessary; if Congress’ intention is not unmistakably clear,
recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule of
Atascadero will not be met.141

The clear statement canon generally requires courts to read narrowly statutes
purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity or alter the balance between
federal and state powers, to ensure Congress has not overstepped its prescribed
Article II constitutional role. For example, in Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, the Court held that Congress needed to provide a clear
statement that state acceptance of federal funds would necessarily waive state
sovereign immunity.142 Deploying this canon often takes the form of a

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (“A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”).
136. Id. at 242-43.
137. 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
138. Id. at 64-65.
139. Id. at 66.
140. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (holding that states cannot
constructively consent to waive sovereign immunity); Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 290
(2011) (holding that when using its spending power, Congress must provide a clear statement
to indicate acceptance of funds requires waiver of sovereign immunity). But see Lapides v.
Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (holding that state waived
sovereign immunity by voluntarily availing itself of federal forum).
141. 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989). Cf. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maintenance,
492 U.S. 96, 100 (1989) (rejecting any use of legislative history to provide congressional intent
to abrogate sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy context).
142. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
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presumption against waiver.143
Of course, some legal fictions exist to allow a private party to bring suit
against the state, even where state sovereign immunity has not been waived or
abrogated using a clear statement. Traditionally, private parties may only sue the
government for non-monetary purposes, such as injunctive relief, using the legal
fiction of officer suits for official action, where the suit seeks prospective relief
against state officials acting in violation of federal law.144 While sovereign
immunity bars suit directly against the state, officer suits allow injunctive relief
against a state where no monetary relief is sought.145 However, suits which are
truly against the government may not simply be reformulated to be against an
appropriate officer. For example, in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corporation, the Court upheld a sovereign immunity defense by a federal official
after the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract for sale of coal against the
government.146 There, it was immaterial that the plaintiff sought injunctive relief
rather than monetary relief, so that the government would abide by the contract.
The Court understood the suit to be against the government itself because the
contract was binding on the government rather than the officer in his individual
capacity. Regardless, the nature of the suit required the consent of the sovereign
for a private plaintiff to bring the action in court. In short, it is clear that any
infringement on state sovereign immunity is invalid unless it falls within one of
the predicate scenarios and is accompanied by a clear and unequivocal statement.
In the case of abrogation by the federal government or blanket consent to suit by
a state, it must be shown textually, without reference to legislative history. The
U.S. territories’ ability to avail themselves of sovereign immunity has not
reached the Supreme Court.147
143. College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 682 (“[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of sovereign
immunity) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). The
Court recently expanded this presumption in Sossamon v. Texas, in which a prison inmate
brought suit against Texas, using the clear statement standard to analyze state waiver of
sovereign immunity, holding that it is a “longstanding rule that a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be expressly and unequivocally stated in the text of the relevant statute.” Sossamon v.
Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285, 290 (2011) (finding that the phrase “appropriate relief” in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-2(a) was not so free from ambiguity that the Court could conclude that the States,
by receiving federal funds, had unequivocally expressed intent to waive their sovereign
immunity). Several circuit courts have taken this theory further than the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 833 F.3d 360, 376 (3d Cir.
2016) (“mere acquiescence is insufficient to abrogate sovereign immunity. A state’s gratuity
waiver must be knowing and voluntary.”).
144. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908); Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540
U.S. 431, 437 (2004).
145. See, e.g., JOHN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1987) (noting that it is consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment to allow suits against state officers for constitutional violations).
146. 337 U.S. 682, 703 (1949).
147. The First Circuit held that Puerto Rico may assert sovereign immunity, and that
American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and the U.S. Virgin Islands cannot.
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II. COURTS GRAPPLE WITH THE COLLISION
Few courts have had cause to address the collision of eminent domain power
and state sovereign immunity.148 Eminent domain has been exercised largely by
the sovereign itself, much more rarely by a private party via delegated power,
and far more scarcely by a private party seeking to take land from a state.149 This
Part will analyze how state sovereign immunity collides with eminent domain
power in the context of two statutes where Congress has delegated federal
takings power to private parties, discussing how courts have attempted to resolve
those collisions.
The foregoing Subparts of this Article beg a few questions. State sovereign
immunity existed prior to the Constitution and was reaffirmed by the Eleventh
Amendment. Eminent domain, similarly, was prevalent before the founding and
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause limited the federal government’s
exercise of eminent domain to predetermined limits of public use and just
compensation. How is it possible, then, that these provisions have not collided
until now? Why haven’t questions about which sovereign power reigns supreme
arisen in the past?
As many property scholars have noted, the American history of takings can
be divided into a few periods: (1) ratification to reconstruction; (2) the railroad
acts to 1922; and (3) 1922 to present. And a potential answer to the questions
raised above begins with the fact that the states were not subject to the Fifth
Amendment’s limitations on eminent domain until well after the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification. Thus, as some have proposed, it is quite likely that
the federal government did not frequently attempt to condemn lands itself, and
instead had states do so on its behalf, so it could avoid paying just compensation
or following the requirement that the takings be for public use. Thus, assuming
the foregoing to be true, property would not have been taken in an unconsenting
state, or from an unconsenting state, because the state would have been the entity
effectuating the takings.
The following Subpart traces collisions between state sovereign immunity
and eminent domain, addressing the few cases that have grappled with the
intersection of private party delegation of federal eminent domain with state
Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Service and Office of Personnel, 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983); Guam
Soc. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F.Supp. 1422, 1430 (D. Guam 1990);
Norita v. Northern Mariana Islands, 331 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 2003); Tonder v. M/V The
Burkholder, 630 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (D.V.I. 1986).
148. Where federal law provided for takings to be exercised by private actors, these
eminent domain proceedings were largely conducted in state court proceedings. This can be
in large part explained by the fact that federal general question jurisdiction did not exist in
federal courts until 1875, so any prior federal caselaw existed in diversity or admiralty.
149. There have been instances where the federal government condemned state land
directly. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941);
North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983). However, for reasons discussed below,
there is reason to think these cases are no longer good law.
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sovereign immunity. This intersection arises with respect to the Natural Gas Act,
the Federal Power Act, and inverse condemnation suits against states. There are
a few other statutes which delegate federal eminent domain power to private
actors, but the dearth of caselaw has made them unremarkable.150 Here, we
examine federal statutory provisions and implied causes of action arising out of
eminent domain, which purport to allow private parties to sue unconsenting
states.
A. Natural Gas Act
Gas production in the United States did not begin in earnest until the mid1800s, and gas was not transported until the 1870s.151 The Natural Gas Act,
enacted in 1938, created a regulatory framework around the interstate
transportation and sale of natural gas in the United States.152 Congress passed the
Natural Gas Act pursuant to Interstate Commerce Clause authority153 and, for the
first time, took federal control of interstate gas transmission. The Act originally
delegated associated regulatory powers to the Federal Power Commission, which
was created to regulate hydropower projects under federal control in 1920 and
was reorganized as a five-member independent regulatory commission in
1930.154 The Federal Power Commission was later replaced by FERC in 1977.
The 1938 Natural Gas Act had no eminent domain provision, but Congress
amended it in 1947 to enable certain gas pipeline developers to take land upon
satisfying enumerated conditions.155 Congressional testimony on the 1947
Amendments reflects the difficulty that gas producers faced in acquiring land
using state eminent domain laws, and the Amendment that later became
Section 717f(h) provided a mechanism to take private land for interstate
pipelines when state eminent domain laws were unable or insufficient to be
utilized. In some instances, state eminent domain power was circumscribed by
150. See, e.g., General Bridge Act, 33 U.S.C. § 532. There are several procedural statutes
which govern jurisdiction or how federal takings must be effectuated, but do not affirmatively
grant takings powers. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970 (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.; 40 U.S.C. § 3113 (“An officer of the Federal
Government authorized to acquire real estate for the erection of a public building or for other
public uses may acquire the real estate for the Government by condemnation, under judicial
process, when the officer believes that it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to
do so. The Attorney General, on application of the officer, shall have condemnation
proceedings begun within 30 days from receipt of the application at the Department of
Justice.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1358 (federal jurisdiction).
151. See Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 990-91 (2015).
152. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z.
153. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 329, 334 (1951).
154. Hydropower and FERC, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/VL5PUDGF.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 80-245, ch. 333, § 717f(h), 61
Stat. 459 (1947).
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requirements that the public use was limited to use by the citizens of the state
exercising eminent domain. The report mentions Arkansas, where out of state
corporations lacked the power to condemn private property, and Wisconsin,
where only Wisconsin corporations were expressly permitted to take property.156
The House hearings do not indicate there was a traditional holdout problem,
where a state refused to consent to pipeline construction in the state. Thus,
Congress did not attempt to solve for state holdouts or displace traditional state
roles. Rather, the problem only occurred where a state served as a “bridge”
between a source and the pipeline’s ultimate destination, without benefitting
from pipeline service. Because some state eminent domain authority was
insufficient for interstate transportation, such as Nebraska, where corporations
only had eminent domain power if they distributed gas in the state, trouble
arose.157
The resulting Section 717f(h) delegated federal eminent domain authority to
qualified private certificate holders to take lands necessary for pipeline
construction, and made FERC responsible for determining if a given applicant
qualified for a certificate.158 The statute provides:
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot
acquire by contract . . . the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and
maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas, and the
necessary land or other property, in addition to right-of-way, for the location
of . . . stations or equipment necessary to the proper operation of such pipe line
or pipe lines, it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such
property may be located, or in the State courts.159

Section 717f(h) gives flexibility for condemnations to be effectuated by state or
federal courts where the property is located. This provision is solely
jurisdictional, and contains no language speaking to abrogation or otherwise
altering a state’s sovereign immunity. In this way, the Natural Gas Act provides
no more textual basis for an abrogation of state sovereign immunity than the
general jurisdictional statute for eminent domain proceedings.160 Further, it
156. Amendments to the Natural Gas Act: Hearing on H.R. 2956 Before the H. Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong. 380, 423 (1947) (memorandum of Rep.
Schwabe, Member, H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
157. Id.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). Although beyond the scope of this Article, the authorizations
that parties require to demonstrate public interest often lie beyond FERC’s sole jurisdiction.
For example, environmental authorizations for the project are integral to determining whether
a certificate applicant is “qualified” within the meaning of the statute, including Clean Air Act
substantive obligations, and permits under the Clean Water Act sections 401 and 404, which
may be exercised under authority delegated by the EPA to a state environmental agency. Del.
Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 857 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Natural Gas Act certificates
are subject to the Clean Water Act); 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (Clean Air
Act).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1358 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
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appears to be extremely rare that pipeline companies bring Natural Gas Act
condemnation cases in state courts.161
The Natural Gas Act’s eminent domain provision does not contain any
explicit limitation on the lands that may be taken using a valid certificate. Some
have argued for an understanding of the Act to apply to both public and private
lands. This argument is tenuously predicated in large part on the Natural Gas
Act’s eminent domain provision being unlike a similar statutory provision in the
Federal Power Act, which explicitly precludes federally authorized takings of
state property already dedicated to public recreational use.162 Notably, the
Natural Gas Act does not delegate the federal government’s takings power to
FERC directly, and thus the agency itself is not empowered to condemn land; it
may only determine whether an applicant meets the certificate of public
convenience and necessity standard. There remains some debate about whether
the Commission has the power to curtail eminent domain rights by attaching
conditions when issuing certificates, or whether, as the Commission maintains,
it has no such authority to address the applicants’ exercise of eminent domain
authority.163
To comply with the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause public use
limitation, the Natural Gas Act’s statutory text requires that the Commission
assess the public convenience and necessity—a public use determination—of
each proposed project.164 The 1947 Natural Gas Act amendment, which later
proceedings to condemn real estate for the use of the United States or its departments or
agencies.”).
161. Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry by Private
Entities Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under the Natural Gas Act and the
Federal Power Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 499, 504 (2006).
162. See infra Part III.B. See also Order on Petition for Declaratory Order, PennEast
Pipeline Co., 170 FERC ¶ 61,064 (Jan. 30, 2020). Although the Federal Power Act was
amended in 1992 to clarify that eminent domain power delegated to qualified hydropower
providers could not be used to condemn certain state land, no such parallel amendment was
proposed for the Natural Gas Act.
163. PennEast Pipeline Co., 170 FERC ¶ 61,064 at P 50 (Jan. 30, 2020) (“[T]he
Commission has previously found that it has no role in eminent domain proceedings that result
from the issuance of a certificate and that it is not involved in the acquisition of property rights
through those proceedings.”); see also Certificate Rehearing Order, PennEast Pipeline Co.,
164 FERC ¶ 61,098 at P 33 (Aug. 10, 2018) (“The Commission does not have the authority to
limit a pipeline company’s use of eminent domain once the company has received its
certificate of public convenience and necessity.”).
164. The statute also contains language grounding it within the Commerce Clause,
noting that “it is declared that the business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate
distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation in
matters relating to the transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign
commerce is necessary in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 717(a). This language justified
taking federal control over an area of commerce that had long been within the state purview.
While some argue that this language demonstrates public use for all pipelines, that proposition
is at odds with the individual certification test, and Section 717f(h)’s express reliance on that
test. Moreover, it preceded the 1947 amendments delegating eminent domain authority, and
are not referenced therein.
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became 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), reflects a recognition that the previous system,
which relied on state eminent domain laws, was insufficient to meet the nation’s
need for natural gas development.165 Thus, federal eminent domain for national
pipelines was in at least some cases in the public interest. This is the basis for the
statute’s eminent domain delegation to qualified private parties.166
The Natural Gas Act contains no clear statement explicitly abrogating state
sovereign immunity. In order for any court to find jurisdiction for a private
party’s claim against a state without a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity,
the statute must make an unmistakably clear statement that Congress has
delegated its authority to a private actor. Applying the clear statement rule, a
narrow reading of the statute must still evince an intention to unequivocally
abrogate, delegate or waive a state’s sovereign immunity. Further, even taking a
broader tact, the Natural Gas Act has no other reference to states, immunity,
eminent domain or altering the traditional balance between state and federal
powers. The Natural Gas Act condemnation provision does not contain any
language that anticipates that private actors will be able to bring such suits
against states in federal court, much less an unmistakably clear statement that
evidences Congressional intent that the provision should serve to effectively
abrogate state sovereign immunity to such suits in federal court.167 Nor does the
statute address any delegation of the federal government’s exception to Eleventh
Amendment state sovereign immunity.
Even setting aside the clear statement rule requirements, and instead taking
a purposivist interpretation of congressional intent, Congress would not have
understood the Natural Gas Act to have abrogated state sovereign immunity.
Because the Natural Gas Act was passed prior to the brief period following Union
Gas, where the Court changed course and made clear that sovereign immunity
could be abrogated using the Commerce Clause, it would have been beyond what
Congress understood the outer limits of its power to be in 1947 to abrogate state
sovereign immunity using the Commerce Clause. The Natural Gas Act would
not have needed language specifically precluding condemnation actions against
a state or state real property interest, consistent with congressional understanding
of the limits of the Commerce Clause power in 1947, when the Natural Gas Act’s
eminent domain provision was passed. Thus, employing present doctrine,
whether or not Congress can delegate its exception to state sovereign immunity,
Congress did not explicitly delegate its exception to sovereign immunity in the
165. See Amendments to the Natural Gas Act: Hearing on H.R. 2956 Before the H.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com., 80th Cong. 608-15 (1947) (Statement of John M.
Crimmins, Member, Law Department of Koppers Co.).
166. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(e), (h).
167. However, on a 2-1 vote, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recently
issued a declaratory order characterizing the lack of reference to states in the Natural Gas Act
as ambiguous with regard to how the Natural Gas Act applies to state-owned property,
allowing the Commission to determine the Natural Gas Act did apply. PennEast Pipeline Co.,
170 FERC ¶ 61,064. The Commission declined to opine on whether the Gas Act abrogated
state sovereign immunity. Id.
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Natural Gas Act, and Congress could not have abrogated state sovereign
immunity through the Natural Gas Act.
Finding that the Natural Gas Act precludes private parties from effectuating
takings of state land in federal courts will not yield catastrophic results. Although
the United States already has extensive infrastructure to frack and transport
natural gas, some analyses “urge that future infrastructure expansion is
necessary,”168 if only because new corporate affiliate structured transactions
allow significant profits from building infrastructure unrelated to unmet capacity
demands.169 In 1938, when Congress passed the Natural Gas Act, people could
not get gas to heat their homes in the winter, because of limited gas supply and
wartime steel shortages. Now, the industry itself acknowledges a glut of gas
supply without corresponding demand.170 If the natural gas industry grows, and
if FERC fails to correct its practice of accepting affiliate’s private contracts to
exclusively establish public need, more private pipeline companies holding valid
FERC certificates of public necessity and convenience could attempt to condemn
lands owned by sovereign states. Yet, few courts have confronted the collision
of this eminent domain provision and state sovereign immunity. The Third
Circuit’s opinion in In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC., in which the court found
that Section 717f(h) contained no clear statement of Congressional intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, is the most prominent, because a state took
the unusual step of exercising its sovereign immunity to defend its lands from
private condemnation.171
1. In re PennEast Pipeline Company
On January 19, 2018, FERC issued an order granting a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC, finding it met
the Natural Gas Act’s Section 717f(e) standard for certification of a proposed
120-mile pipeline.172 In February 2018, as certificate holder, PennEast initiated
more than 180 federal condemnation proceedings in federal courts in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania.173 The State of New Jersey owns or has ownership interests in
168. See Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 151, at 1004.
169. See, e.g., Spire STL Pipeline LLC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,134 (Nov. 21, 2019) (Glick,
Comm’r, dissenting at ¶ 2); Steve Isser, Natural Gas Pipeline Certification and Ratemaking
(Oct 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/7BZF-WCRZ.
170. Clifford Krauss, Natural Gas Boom Fizzles as a U.S. Glut Sinks Profits, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/9E79-BLB7.
171. 938 F.3d 96, 108 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-1039, 2021 WL 357257
(U.S. Feb. 3, 2021). The Supreme Court will hear an appeal in spring 2021.
172. PennEast Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ¶ 61,053 (Jan. 19, 2018) (Certificate Rehearing
Order).
173. See In re Penneast Pipeline Co., LLC, No. CV 18-1585, 2018 WL 6584893 (D.N.J.
Dec. 14, 2018), at *6, *26, vacated and remanded sub nom. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC,
938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019), as amended (Sept. 11, 2019), as amended (Sept. 19, 2019);
PennEast Pipeline Co. v. A Permanent Easement of 0.06 Acres + in Moore Township,
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a significant number of properties that PennEast attempted to condemn, and over
which the district court asserted jurisdiction. New Jersey raised sovereign
immunity as a defense to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.174
The New Jersey district court ruled that the certificate conferred on PennEast
the right to condemn properties along the approved pipeline route, and that it
could exercise this power via preliminary injunction to immediately enter and
survey the properties.175 The New Jersey district court would proceed to the
valuation stage to determine just compensation.176 It largely failed to engage with
any discussion of state sovereign immunity, finding instead that PennEast stood
in the shoes of the federal government by virtue of the delegated federal eminent
domain authority contained within NGA Section 717f(h), and therefore that state
sovereign immunity did not apply to the case at hand.177 It stated:
PennEast has been vested with the federal government’s eminent domain
powers and stands in the shoes of the sovereign. The Court is not persuaded by
the State Defendants’ argument that the NGA is silent as to the rights of a
private gas company; the NGA expressly allows “any holder of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity” to acquire rights of way “by the exercise of
the right of eminent domain” in this District Court. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). As
more thoroughly discussed below, PennEast holds a valid certificate as issued
by the FERC Order. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable, and
the State Defendants are not entitled to immunity.178

Thus, according to the court, because PennEast held a valid certificate, it also
held the same sovereign rights as the federal government over the state when
exercising delegated eminent domain powers.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed with this
theory. The Third Circuit agreed that Congress had delegated federal eminent
domain authority to qualified private parties, with FERC determining whether
the parties satisfied the requisite legal standard to obtain that power.179 However,
the appellate court analyzed delegation of eminent domain independently from
Northampton County, Pennsylvania, Tax Parcel NO. J5-3-3 et al, No. 18-cv-00505 (E.D. Pa
Feb. 6, 2018) (WL).
174. State Opp’n To Order to Show Cause at 24, In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 2018 WL
6584893 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2018) (No. 18-01684).
175. PennEast Pipeline Co., Tax Parcel No. 1007-32-33, No. 18-cv-01699 (D.N.J.
Feb. 7, 2018) (WL).
176. Order of Condemnation at 3, In re PennEast Pipeline Co., No. 18-01684, 2018 WL
6584893 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2018) (according PennEast the right to condemn a permanent Right
of Way and temporary easement). As of this writing, because of the Third Circuit opinion, the
District Court has not acted with respect to the private parties.
177. See State Defendants Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at 8, In re
PennEast Pipeline Co., No. 18-01684, 2018 WL 6584893.
178. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., No. 18-01684, 2018 WL 6584893, at *12 (internal
footnote omitted) (citing City of Newark v. Cent. R.R. of N.J., 297 F. 77, 82 (3d Cir. 1924);
Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1977); City of
Davenport v. Three Fifths of an Acre of Land, 252 F.2d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1958)), vacated
and remanded, 938 F.3d 96 (3d. Cir. 2019).
179. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d at 99-100.
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sovereign immunity, rejecting the notion that Congressional delegation of
eminent domain power automatically carried with it a delegation of the federal
government’s exception to state sovereign immunity protections. Thus, the Third
Circuit held sovereign immunity precluded a private party from suing the state
of New Jersey to condemn state lands in federal court because the Natural Gas
Act “does not constitute a delegation to private parties of the federal
government’s exemption from Eleventh Amendment immunity.”180 The Third
Circuit further noted that the Gas Act “does not refer to the States at all.”181 The
Third Circuit then directed the district court to dismiss claims against New
Jersey.182
The Third Circuit only went so far as determining that Congress has not
delegated that authority through the Natural Gas Act. However, it discussed the
pipeline company’s theory that it had received delegation of the federal
government’s exception to state sovereign immunity. First, the PennEast court
analyzed Blatchford’s caution that exceptions to sovereign immunity likely
could not be delegated.183 It concluded that even had there been a clear statement
of delegation, there was a significant constitutional question of “whether the
federal government can delegate its ability to hale fellow sovereigns into federal
court and force the States to respond.”184 Next, the court dismissed any analogy
to qui tam actions against a state, where a private relator sues in the federal
government’s name, as imprecise and inapplicable. Finally, the Third Circuit
concluded with a realistic acknowledgement that the sovereign immunity
decisions could cause precisely the problems that eminent domain is meant to
fix: a state’s power to assert sovereign immunity may frustrate some projects.
Yet, the Court’s proposed solution suggested a politically accountable federal
official could effectuate a condemnation of state land rather than the delegated
private entity.185
Critiquing the Third Circuit’s opinion in In re PennEast, Bernard Bell
concludes that separately analyzing sovereign immunity and eminent domain are
“two aspects of the exercise . . . that are not, as a practical matter, divisible.”186
Bell wonders why Congress would empower a private actor with federal powers,
theoretically enforceable in federal courts, but fail to grant that private party
power to effectuate such a power.187 The answer, he concludes, is that Congress
180. Id. at 112-113.
181. Id. at 111.
182. Id. at 113.
183. Id. at 105 (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786-86
(1991).
184. Id. at 109.
185. Id. at 113. The court’s proposed solution, as suggested by New Jersey, indicates the
state’s likely consent to a federal taking in this instance.
186. Bernard Bell, Delegation of Eminent Domain Powers to Private Entities: In Re
PennEast Pipeline Co., NOTICE & COMMENT: YALE J. ON REG. (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://perma.cc/B24Y-4WR8.
187. Id.
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did not intend to limit the party’s ability to effectuate a taking, so abrogation of
state sovereign immunity must be embedded in the delegation of eminent
domain. Yet, this critique ignores the independent force and history of sovereign
immunity. Further, it fails to engage with the central tenets of sovereign
immunity canons: Congress’ eminent domain delegation is not a self-executing
abrogation of state sovereign immunity because it did not contain a clear
statement, and Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity using the
commerce power.
For Bell, the result of the Third Circuit’s decision is that it would “authorize
private entities to proceed by simply taking property and imposing upon states
the obligation to bring inverse condemnation suits.”188 However, it seems highly
unlikely that private pipeline companies would invade and claim ownership of
government property without state consent or judicial permission. Invading state
property would attack the heart of what it means to be a sovereign, and states are
imbued with police power in substantial part. Further, while some courts have
allowed qualified certificate holders immediate entry,189 the statutory mandate of
Section 717f(h) clearly states that eminent domain may only be exercised in
courts. Therefore, the invasion scenario imagined would be outside of the
delegated authority granted by Congress. As described below, the two other
courts confronting whether a private party may initiate suit against a state entity
to effectuate Natural Gas Act takings have analyzed the issue similarly to In re
PennEast.
2. Sabine Line v. A Permanent Easement of 4.25 +/- Acres of Land in
Orange County, Tex.
In Sabine Line v. A Permanent Easement of 4.25 +/- Acres of Land in
Orange County, Tex., a pipeline company attempted to assert eminent domain
power over land owned by an arm of the state of Texas. The pipeline company,
Sabine, argued that Texas was not entitled to sovereign immunity from
condemnation proceedings for its property because: (1) the practical effect of the
Natural Gas Act was to treat those holders of FERC-issued certificates of public
convenience and necessity as delegees of the federal government’s eminent
domain power; and (2) that allowed the pipeline company to condemn Texas
lands in federal court without the state’s consent because Congress abrogated the
states’ sovereign immunity through enactment of the Natural Gas Act.190
The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that the pipeline
company was not the federal government, and, although it had been delegated
federal eminent domain power, Sabine nonetheless was still a private party for
188. Id.
189. East Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004) (allowing quick
take under Section 717f(h)), reh’g denied, 369 F.2d 357 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978
(2004).
190. Sabine Pipe Line, 327 F.R.D. 131, 139 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
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the jurisdictional purposes of sovereign immunity.191 The district court, similar
to the Third Circuit in In re PennEast, bifurcated its analysis of eminent domain
and sovereign immunity powers, examining the intersection of the two. In doing
so, it found that Sabine could not hale Texas, or an arm of the state, into federal
court without the state’s consent even though Sabine may have had a substantive
right had the state consented to jurisdiction.192 In other words, it is not an inherent
attribute of delegated eminent domain powers to effectuate that right against a
state in federal court without the consent of a state. The court then found that the
Natural Gas Act’s Section 717f(h) did not delegate the federal government’s
exception to state sovereign immunity.
However, the Sabine court went further, and discussed whether Congress
even had the power to delegate the federal exception to state sovereign immunity.
There, the court said:
The Supreme Court, however, has doubted that the federal government’s
exemption to the Eleventh Amendment can be delegated. Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991). In considering the proposition, the
Supreme Court stated: ‘The consent, ‘inherent in the convention,’ to suit by the
United States—at the instance and under the control of responsible federal
officers—is not consent to suit by anyone whom the United States might
select.’193

Although the pipeline company in Sabine attempted to argue that the issue was
one of federal supremacy, the Sabine court rejected that argument.194
3. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. .12 Acres of Land, More or Less,
in Washington County, Maryland
In 2019, the District Court for the District of Maryland confronted the same
issue in Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. .12 Acres of Land.195 In Columbia
Gas, a pipeline company received a FERC certificate on July 19, 2018 to build a
proposed 3.38-mile natural gas pipeline from Pennsylvania to West Virginia,
which crossed through western Maryland and under the Potomac River.
Although the pipeline company agreed with the Maryland Department of Natural
Resources on an easement price that was above appraised value, the State Board
of Public Works rejected this agreement.196 The pipeline company initiated a
condemnation action after further negotiations with the Maryland Department of
191. Id. at 140 (“Sabine’s theory, thus, conflates two separate rights held by the federal
government: the right to exercise eminent domain and the right to sue states in federal court.”).
192. See id. at 140 (“‘In ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits brought
by other States or by the Federal Government.’”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755
(1999).
193. Sabine Line, 327 F.R.D. at 140.
194. Id. at 139-40.
195. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. .12 Acres of Land, GLR-19-1444, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 116524, at *2-3 (D. Md. July 12, 2019).
196. Id. at 3-4.
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Natural Resources stalled.197 Columbia Gas filed suit against the state on May
16, 2019.198
In ruling on a preliminary injunction, which would have allowed the pipeline
company to immediately enter the state lands at issue, the district court found
that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because although the Natural Gas Act
granted Columbia Gas the “power of eminent domain to condemn land, the
Court . . . [found] that the Natural Gas Act does not abrogate state sovereign
immunity or delegate the United States’ state sovereign exception to permit
Columbia to sue the State of Maryland for an order of condemnation without
Maryland’s consent.”199 The court characterized the state’s argument as
jurisdictional, such that “sovereign immunity bars Columbia’s suit
notwithstanding Columbia’s alleged substantive right.”200 Here too, the district
court determined that Congress had not abrogated state sovereign immunity
through the Natural Gas Act because the statute was not passed pursuant to a
valid exercise of congressional power to abrogate, which is limited primarily to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.201 The district court rejected any
suggestion that the Supremacy Clause or “other enumerated powers” allowed
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal courts under
Commerce Clause powers.202 As of July 2020, the parties are mediating in
advance of a potential appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
In sum, these three examples—the only cases that have considered the
question—have held that the Natural Gas Act does not abrogate state sovereign
immunity using a clear statement. These cases did not reach the constitutional
question of whether the Natural Gas Act could abrogate state sovereign
immunity. Rather they illustrate the doctrinal difficulty with interpreting a statute
passed pursuant to Article I powers as allowing private parties to exercise
eminent domain against an unconsenting state.
B. Federal Power Act
The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) is a second statutory provision where state
sovereign immunity may clash with a private party’s use of federal eminent
domain power. The FPA regulates the transmission of electricity in interstate
commerce and wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce. Originally
passed in 1920 as the Federal Water Power Act, and amended several times since,
courts have generally understood the FPA and Natural Gas Act to mirror each

197. Id. at 2.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 4-5.
200. Id. at 7.
201. Id. at 10.
202. Id. at 16 (“If the federal government deems it important to condemn the [State’s]
land, it is within the federal government’s right to bring such an action.”).
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other and have frequently applied the interpretations of one statute to the other.203
The FPA first created federal authority over hydroelectric power regulation in
the United States before adding the provisions relating to interstate sales and
transmission of electricity in 1935.204 Although the federal government
controlled navigable waters prior to the passage of the FPA, hydroelectric power
had previously been a duty relegated to individual states, and the Act tasked the
Federal Power Commission, later FERC, with federal control over the industry.
This created a patchwork of state and local regulations, inhibiting regional
energy infrastructure.205 The FPA helped to clarify the state and federal roles in
the electricity sector.
First, private parties may exercise eminent domain against private lands for
hydropower projects licensed by FERC:
When any licensee can not acquire by contract, . . . it may acquire the same by
the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United
States for the district in which such land or other property may be located, or in
the State courts. . . . That no licensee may use the right of eminent domain under
this section to acquire any lands or other property that, prior to the date of
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 [enacted Oct. 24, 1992], were
owned by a State or political subdivision thereof and were part of or included
within any public park, recreation area or wildlife refuge established under State
or local law. In the case of lands or other property that are owned by a State or
political subdivision and are part of or included within a public park, recreation
area or wildlife refuge established under State or local law on or after the date
of enactment of such Act [enacted Oct. 24, 1992], no licensee may use the right
of eminent domain under this section to acquire such lands or property unless
there has been a public hearing held in the affected community and a finding by
the Commission, after due consideration of expressed public views and the
recommendations of the State or political subdivision that owns the lands or
property, that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purposes
for which such lands or property are owned.206

A second provision enables takings for electric transmission facilities regulated
by FERC.207 Each explicitly carves out or places limits on using eminent domain
203. Prior to the 1992 Federal Power Act amendments, the Federal Power Act and
Natural Gas Act were interpreted in tandem. See, e.g., KY. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Penn. Public
Utilities Comm’n, 862 F.2d 69, 74 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988) (“the two statutes ‘are in all material
respects substantially identical,’” and decisions interpreting them may be cited
interchangeably.”).
204. Fed. Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as 16 U.S.C.
§ 791) (repealed 1935).
205. Giovanni S. Saarman González, Note, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal
Power Act: Promoting Clean Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1422, 1430-31 (2016)
(“Responding to the uncertain and varying demands of municipalities as well as local political
corruption, private utilities sought greater uniformity in state law.”) (citing William Boyd,
Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1660 (2014)).
206. 16 U.S.C. § 814.
207. In the case of a permit under subsection (b) for electric transmission facilities
to be located on property other than property owned by the United States or a State,
if the permit holder cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner
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for certain state-owned lands.
Discussion of a key distinction in the FPA’s two takings provisions, which
delegate the federal government’s eminent domain power to private actors, has
been largely absent from academic literature. In 1992, a major amendment
included language explicitly prohibiting certain state lands from being taken
using the eminent domain authority conferred by the Act.208 The inclusion of this
language may also account for why the issue has not come up frequently in recent
years, especially during the proliferation of the Supreme Court’s sovereign
immunity cases.
There are three other notable differences between hydropower projects and
linear gas pipelines that may explain why the conflict between eminent domain
and sovereign immunity has not arisen: (1) for hydropower projects, the statute
provides states where the project is constructed will receive a set financial benefit
from the build; (2) the land taken is confined to one parcel rather than an
extensive corridor; and (3) the FPA is limited to waterways which may be
dammed for hydropower, whereas the Natural Gas Act allows condemnation of
any conceivable land nationwide which could be used in connection with gas
transmission. These distinctions may favor states’ willingness to consent to such
condemnations.
Further inquiry into legislative history also casts doubt on the intended
function of this FPA provision. It is possible to understand Congress as intending
to be explicitly clear about the reach of these powers, and would allow for other
state or municipal lands to be taken if they were not parks, recreational areas, or
wildlife areas, so long as the state consented. However, the alteration of the
original takings provision in 1992 was passed during the brief interstitial period
between Union Gas and Seminole Tribe, where Congress was under the mistaken
impression that it could abrogate state sovereign immunity using the Commerce
Clause.209 Thus, while the legislative history does not provide a definitive
indication of why Congress decided to explicitly include the prohibition on state
takings, it is likely because it sought to clarify the outer limits of the power it
wished to delegate when it believed it had greater power to employ. Additionally,
of the property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to
construct or modify the transmission facilities, the permit holder may acquire the
right-of-way by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of
the United States for the district in which the property concerned is located, or in the
appropriate court of the State in which the property is located.
16 USC § 824p(e)(1).
208. [T]he right of eminent domain under this section to acquire any lands or other
property that, prior to the date of enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, were
owned by a State or political subdivision thereof and were part of or included within
any public park, recreation area or wildlife refuge established under State or local
law.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 3009 (1992). Interestingly, this
alteration of the FPA’s eminent domain provisions was not made to the Natural Gas Act’s
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
209. Cf. In re PennEast, 938 F.3d at 108.
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it may have reflected the Congressional determination that such lands were
already in public use, and thus the recognition that allowing a private party to
condemn them would be pushing the constitutional envelope on public use too
far. Finally, the statute’s use of this language may describe a limit on the
character of the lands that a private applicant may seek to condemn as a siting
directive, rather than revealing any Congressional intent that the State must
consent to such suits.
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt with the issue directly, in City of
Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, the Court was faced with the situation where a
municipal utility was empowered by the FPA to condemn state-owned land,
although the state itself had not empowered that political subdivision to seize the
state’s land. The City of Tacoma, Washington was a qualified licensee to
condemn a fish hatchery owned by the state of Washington on the Cowlitz River
for the purpose of building a hydropower dam. In the proceedings below, the
Washington State Supreme Court had held that even though Tacoma had
delegated federal condemnation power through the FPA to condemn a state fish
hatchery, it lacked the power to exercise that delegated power, since it had not
been granted by the state.210 The Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds,
but did not take up the underlying issue, possibly in recognition of the difficult
federalism questions it posed.211 At base, it is a reflection of the Court’s
preference for a local entity imbued with federal power over state opposition to
an infrastructure project, even after the state supreme court held that the local
entity lacked the power. It is also the case that courts have previously read parties
out of expansive eminent domain statutes.212 In sum, while the Federal Power
Act may engender federalism concerns among some states due to FERC’s
regulatory role,213 these frustrations have largely been unrelated to eminent
domain of state lands.
C. Inverse Condemnation & Regulatory Takings
Inverse condemnation, an implied cause of action, commonly involves a
210. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 307 P.2d 567, 576-77 (Wash. 1957),
rev’d, 357 U.S. 320 (1958). The Washington State Supreme Court relied on a distinction
between the city being prohibited, contrasted with lacking the power. To that court, Tacoma
was not prohibited from taking a state fish hatchery, but lacked the affirmative grant of power
from the state to do so. See also Laurie Reynolds, A Role for Local Government Law in
Federal-State-Local Disputes, 43 URB. LAW. 977, 986, 989-90 (2011). Reynolds characterizes
the Court’s rejection of the frame proposed by the state supreme court as focused on the
exclusive federal jurisdiction over navigable waters and interest in regulating interstate
commerce. Id.
211. City of Tacoma, 357 U.S. at 320.
212. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 113 (1960)
(“[D]espite its general and all-inclusive terms, § 21 does not apply to nor authorize
condemnation of lands or interests in lands owned by the United States.”).
213. James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development
of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71 (2014).
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property owner alleging regulatory takings.214 These actions provide a final
notable example where state sovereign immunity clashes with eminent domain
power. It is worth pausing to acknowledge that the situation described in the
preceding Subparts are somewhat odd in the American system. Eminent domain
is normally exercised by sovereign governments as an integral aspect of their
sovereignty. In the normal course of action, a government entity, using its
sovereign power, identifies a necessary parcel of land which cannot be acquired
by contract and moves to seize that property. Of course, this power is limited by
the Fifth Amendment, requiring that a government only exercise such a power if
the use of that land is for public use, and the property owner is paid just
compensation for the seizure.
Where property is seized, but the taking agent does not proactively pay just
compensation—either because the takings is a regulatory one, or the property is
seized with immediate occupancy—the condemnee is normally entitled to
instigate his or her own action against that agency to ensure that just
compensation is paid. This provides another opportunity to test the bounds of
state sovereign immunity, mirroring another collision between state sovereign
immunity and eminent domain, because, at base, a private party has initiated suit
against a sovereign state without the consent of the state.
Eric Berger has argued that in the inverse condemnation context, the Takings
Clause is self-executing, and thus was an abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.215 At root, this is because the Fifth Amendment provides a remedy to
parties whose land has been taken, and it would be nonsensical to forbid a private
action against a state where the state had acted unconstitutionally by not paying
just compensation.216 Berger discusses the impact of a Supreme Court footnote,
“casually” discussing how the Takings Clause abrogated state sovereign
immunity in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles.217 In 1987, in First English, the Court noted that the Takings
Clause is self-executing, and thus does not require affirmative legislative action
to enable condemnees to bring just compensation claims.218
However, many courts which have confronted the issue have long held that
state sovereign immunity still bars these suits.219 For instance, the Ninth Circuit
held in Seven Up Pete Venture in 2008, that the “constitutionally grounded selfexecuting nature of the Takings Clause does not alter the conventional

214. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
215. Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493 (2006). Some states have interpreted their own constitutional
just compensation clauses as a self-executing abrogation of the state’s sovereign immunity for
the purpose of inverse condemnation suits. Id. at 574-75, nn.407-08 and accompanying text.
216. These actions are more similar to the posture of an officer suit, in which an action
is implied by a state’s unconstitutional or illegal action.
217. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
218. Id. at 315.
219. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 215, 495 n.4.
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application of the Eleventh Amendment.”220 The Ninth Circuit explained that its
decision was in line with the other courts of appeals who had confronted the
question in the inverse condemnation context, and several subsequent decisions
have followed suit.221 In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the First,222 Fourth,223
Fifth,224 Sixth,225 Seventh,226 Tenth,227 and Eleventh228 Circuit Courts of Appeals
have each held that the Takings Clause did not abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
There are few constitutionally mandated remedies, and it is arguably the case
that where one exists, it is more likely to be a self-executing abrogation of a
state’s sovereign immunity. Here, the judicial treatment of the Takings Clause as
self-executing is distinct from any notion of the power of eminent domain being
self-executing, because eminent domain power does not arise from the Takings
Clause. Where no such requirement exists, there is no textual or structural reason
why an act of Congress would constitute a self-executing abrogation. Because
holding otherwise would require a federal court to place demands on a state’s
treasury—a core detriment to state dignity, which is a primary rationale behind
the state sovereign immunity —these cases do not end the matter.
In sum, despite their clear distinctions, to the extent that inverse
condemnation actions could be thought constitutionally similar with regard to
state sovereign immunity to those actions initiated by private parties empowered
with eminent domain authority, current caselaw in the majority of circuits
indicates sovereign immunity may attach to any such suit by a private party.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PRECLUDES PRIVATE TAKINGS OF STATE LANDS

220. Seven Up Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 885 (2008). Cf. Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1898) (claim
against a state for property owned by the state barred by sovereign immunity).
221. Seven Up Pete Venture, 523 F.3d at 955 (collecting cases). But see Fowler v.
Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that state sovereign immunity shields state
from suits against the “general fund, not investment funds held for the benefit of its
employees”), reh’ng en banc denied, 918 F.3d 644 (2019).
222. Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31, 33 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982)
(per curiam).
223. Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 553 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[E]very other court of
appeals to have decided the question has held that the Takings Clause does not override the
Eleventh Amendment.” (internal citations omitted)).
224. John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir.
1994) (“[A] Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation claim brought directly against the
State . . . [is] barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
225. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 526-28 (6th Cir. 2004), overruled on other
grounds by San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., Cal. et al., 545 U.S. 323 (2005)
(“[The State] enjoys sovereign immunity in the federal courts from [a] federal takings
claim . . . .”).
226. Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980).
227. Williams v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 928 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2019).
228. Robinson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir. 1992).
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USING DELEGATED EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS
If we understand federal eminent domain power and sovereign immunity to
be two inherent attributes of sovereignty, how do we resolve their collision?
While academic scholarship has critically analyzed the history of federal eminent
domain power, with significant disagreement about whether and how this broad
federal power was understood prior to Kohl,229 it is now beyond question that the
federal government has broad power to seize private land.230 This is largely
grounded in historical understanding of the powers traditionally inuring to the
sovereign, and is confirmed by substantial, unbroken judicial authority exploring
the Constitutional limits placed upon it by the Fifth Amendment. The first such
limit, that any taking must be for public use, has been judicially broadened far
beyond its original interpretation.231 And the second, just compensation, is
perhaps more accurately described as a remedial provision rather than a limit.232
Although the federal government has delegated eminent domain authority to
executive branch agencies in several statutes, it has delegated its eminent domain
powers to private parties very few times.233 In 1946, in United States v. Carmack,
229. Baude, supra note 21; Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 151; Grace, supra note 17
(arguing that much of the scholarship discussing whether the federal government believed
itself to possess eminent domain power overlooked the Enclave Clause’s role and restrictions
on federal infrastructure projects, and mistook lack of federal condemnations as evidence that
the power was widely believed lacking.).
230. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 237 (1946); 40 U.S.C. § 3113. However,
even if the founders believed that the federal government could exercise eminent domain
power, the Fifth Amendment specifies that “private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. v. If the Takings Clause is meant to fully
encompass all use of eminent domain power, the surplusage canon applied to a strict textual
would imply that the federal government did not have the power to take state land. Note, too,
that the Supreme Court eventually read out the word “private” from the Takings Clause, but it
did not do so until 1984. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984). However,
if the framers thought that federal eminent domain could be exercised against a state in federal
courts—courts which were not mandated in the Madisonian compromise—why limit the
amendment’s reach to private property? The scant precedent involving the federal
condemnation of state land that exists does little to address this issue. See North Dakota v.
United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313
U.S. 508 (1941).
231. This line of cases includes Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954); Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); and culminates in Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469, 482 (2005).
232. Failure to compensate neither invalidates the original property transfer, nor
prohibits condemnation from proceeding. Cf. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019).
233. See Robert Meltz, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22884, DELEGATION OF THE FEDERAL
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO NONFEDERAL ENTITIES 1 (2008). For example, under 45 U.S.C.
§ 545(d)(1)(B) (1970), federal eminent domain authority had been delegated to Amtrak,
considered to be a private party. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of Land One
1691 Sq. Foot More or Less Parcel of Land in Town of New London, New London City. &
State of Conn., 822 F.2d 1261, 1264 (2d Cir. 1987). That delegation provision, however,
explicitly acknowledged that Amtrak was prohibited from condemning state lands. See id. The
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the Court examined the distinction between these two exercises of delegated
federal eminent domain authority, finding that Congressional delegations to
executive agency officials “authoriz[ed] officials to exercise the sovereign’s
power of eminent domain on behalf of the sovereign itself. This is a general
authorization which carries with it the sovereign’s full powers except such as are
excluded expressly or by necessary implication.” By contrast, the Court found
that:
[a] distinction exists however, in the case of statutes which grant to others, such
as public utilities, a right to exercise the power of eminent domain on behalf of
themselves. These are, in their very nature, grants of limited powers. They do
not include sovereign powers greater than those expressed or necessarily
implied, especially against others exercising equal or greater public powers. In
such cases the absence of an express grant of superiority over conflicting public
uses reflects an absence of such superiority.234

Courts have adjudicated private party eminent domain delegations within the
context of more limited grants, with courts implicitly or explicitly
acknowledging that the grantee is not exercising the sovereign’s own power, but
rather, a more limited grant of that power.235
This Part seeks to show that in the case of private condemnation suits of state
property: (1) taking state land through eminent domain is within the core
concerns of state sovereign immunity doctrine; (2) Congress lacks the power to
abrogate that sovereign immunity; and (3) Congress certainly cannot delegate a
power that it does not itself possess.
A. Impermissible Intrusions on the Core of State Sovereignty
Taking state property is within the core concern of state sovereign immunity
doctrine independent of whether the action was directly against the state eo
nominee or against state property interests in rem. It is clear that the state is an
essential party to any condemnation suit, whether the state owns its land in fee
simple or a coextensive property interest, such as a conservation easement.
Actions against the sovereign’s property are understood to be actions against the
sovereign, and therefore, in rem cases provide an example of sovereign
immunity’s atextual foothold in the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The
general rule is that “[a] federal court cannot summon a State before it in a private
action seeking to divest the State of a property interest.”236 For example, in Ex
parte New York, an admiralty action was brought to recover damages by

Second Circuit found that “Amtrak has not been authorized to exercise the sovereign’s power
of eminent domain. It has been granted a limited power, within the meaning of United States v.
Carmack) . . . .” Id.
234. Carmack, 329 U.S. at 243 n.13. (1946).
235. Id.
236. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 289 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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negligent operation of a boat owned by New York.237 The Supreme Court held
that sovereign immunity prohibited an in rem suit in admiralty involving a state
interest, despite the fact that the Eleventh Amendment explicitly only applies to
suits in “law or equity.” Although some commentators have noted that
subsequent developments of sovereign immunity in the “admiralty context have
not been models of clarity,”238 in Ex parte New York, the Supreme Court found
that sovereign immunity should “be determined not by the mere names of the
titular parties but by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding, as it
appears from the entire record.”239 More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
this basic principle, but required the state to actually own a property interest in
the res.240
In Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., Justice Stevens’
plurality opinion noted that the in rem character of an action does not
automatically prevent a state from asserting sovereign immunity because “an
action for damages could be brought simply by first attaching property that
belonged to the State and then proceeding in rem.”241 There, a treasure salvage
company identified a sunken seventeenth century Spanish ship off the coast of
Key West, Florida and sought a warrant through an in rem admiralty action,
directed at state officials to retain the property found on the ship.242 A fourmember plurality ultimately held that sovereign immunity did not bar the suit
because it was “not an in personam action brought to recover damages from the
State.”243 “At the same time, the opinion for a plurality of four Justices suggested
that the Eleventh Amendment might bar adjudication of the state’s ownership of
the wreckage.”244
After Treasure Salvors, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed
a state to assert sovereign immunity in a garnishment proceeding, even though
they are in rem actions, in Carpenters Pension Fund v. Maryland Department of
Health & Mental Hygiene.245 There, the Fourth Circuit noted garnishment

237. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 490 (1921).
238. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 75, at 918 n.11.
239. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 500 (1921). It is worth calling attention to the fact
that in Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 699 (1982) (plurality), the
court later characterized the claim to have only been brought in admiralty “to enable the court
to acquire jurisdiction over a damages claim that was otherwise barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.”
240. See California v. Deep Sea Research., Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1998)
(“Although the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over general title disputes
relating to state property interests, it does not necessarily follow that it applies to in rem
admiralty actions, or that in such actions, federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over
property that the State does not actually possess.”).
241. Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 699 (1982) (plurality).
242. Id. at 673.
243. Id. at 699.
244. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 75, at 918 n.11.
245. 721 F.3d 217, 225 (4th Cir. 2013).
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actions have both in rem and in personam elements that would require
jurisdiction over the state as the sovereign and its treasury.246 Thus, the court
concluded, regardless of how the suit was characterized—as in rem or in
personam—”it is ultimately seeking recovery from the Maryland treasury.”247
The plurality’s holding in Treasure Salvors did not apply to real property, and
thus may not be instructive. Lessor property, like the artifacts salvaged from the
shipwreck, may impinge on state dignity but do not go directly to the core of
state sovereignty, as landholding and control over land squarely do.
Federal sovereign immunity, while not identical, is analogous, and courts
have largely understood suits against federal government property to be against
the United States itself. For example, in the 1869 admiralty case, The Siren, the
Supreme Court noted that, “there is no distinction between suits against the
government directly, and suits against its property.”248 The Seventh Circuit
recently took a similar approach in Hammer v. United States HHS, in which the
estate of a defunct insurance company sought payment of debts owed to the
company by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.249 Although
analyzing federal sovereign immunity, the Seventh Circuit noted “there is no
general in rem exception to principles of sovereign immunity.”250
When analyzing sovereign immunity as applied to other actors, such as tribal
and foreign sovereign immunity, some state courts have approached the problem
differently. In Cass County Joint Water Resource District v. 1.43 Acres of Land,
the North Dakota Supreme Court held that, because a condemnation proceeding
over property purchased by a Native American tribe was in rem, tribal sovereign
immunity was not a jurisdictional bar.251 The Supreme Court has similarly held
that property owned by foreign states used for non-diplomatic mission purposes
is treated as private property for the purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.252 In Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, the
Court also noted that property ownership of land outside of a sovereign’s
territory “is not an inherently sovereign function.”253
Applying the Ex parte New York formulation, property interests are core to
sovereignty and despite the fact a suit may be formulated as against the land or
property interest in rem, the “essential nature and effect of the proceeding” is
246. Id. at 225 (“While garnishment has been said to be a proceeding in rem, it is not,
strictly speaking, in rem. It partakes both of the nature of a proceeding in personam and a
proceeding in rem.”).
247. Id.
248. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869).
249. Hammer v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.3d 517, 522-23 (7th Cir.
2018).
250. Id. 905 F.3d at 528.
251. Cass Cnty. Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 643 N.W.2d 685, 691
(N.D. 2002).
252. Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199
(2007); Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1655 (2018).
253. Permanent Mission of India to the U.N., 551 U.S. at 201.
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nonetheless against the state owner. Perhaps more strongly favoring this
interpretation of state sovereign immunity is The Siren and subsequent decisions
that emphasized why suits against federal government property were
indistinguishable from suits against the federal government for sovereign
immunity purposes. Although Ex parte New York and Treasure Salvors’ plurality
do not conclusively apply The Siren’s federal sovereign immunity approach to
state sovereign immunity, each case may implicitly understand the question in
terms of state dignity interests, as the Court has done in many other state
sovereign immunity cases.
Real property is critical to a state’s identity and dignity. Wars over state
territorial boundaries and dominion comprise much of the nation’s early history.
Unsurprisingly, then, expressions of their significance are laced through the
Constitution’s provisions. For example, the Enclave Clause provides a limit
where a state must consent for altering state boundaries or removing land from
state jurisdiction. This demonstrates the founders’ respect for state sovereignty
within the federal system, explicitly linking this dignity to control over lands
within their borders.
This is, of course, in addition to the obvious monetary value of property that
a private party empowered with delegated eminent domain power would seek to
take from a sovereign state. Without sovereign immunity acting as a limiting
principle, one could imagine a private, unaccountable energy company
condemning a state capitol in federal court without any recourse from the state.254
Applying a different conception proposed by Louis Jaffe yields the same
result—that state sovereign immunity protects state lands held with unsullied
hands from private condemnnors. Jaffe’s observation posits that wrongful action
on the part of the state, which otherwise may give rise to an action in contract or
tort, could allow a case to proceed against the sovereign independent of their
consent to suit. Here though, for many state lands that comprised the original
thirteen colonies, land title came into the hands of the state unencumbered and
directly from the crown. In other geographic areas further west, states assumed
title as part of statehood. And today, state ownership may result from investing
significant public dollars in land purchases for ecological conservation. In any of
these iterations, state title has not been wrongfully “sullied” by the state in such
a way that could subject the sovereign to suit without its consent.
B. Void Abrogations
Having located state lands well within the core concerns of state sovereign
immunity, the second question we consider in this Part is whether Congress may
abrogate state sovereign immunity using its Article I powers. Plainly said, it may
254. See Amendments to the Natural Gas Act: Hearing on H.R. 2956 Before the H.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com., 80th Cong. 610-15 (1947) (statement of John M.
Crimmins).
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not. As the Court recently held in Allen v. Cooper, stare decisis commands that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I
powers. This would seem to preclude abrogation of state sovereign immunity
using any Article I power, including the Commerce Clause power.
The framework of the modern regulatory state is largely grounded in
Congress’ Article I Commerce Clause Power.255 This, by default, prohibits
abrogation of state sovereign immunity through modern delegations of eminent
domain power, such as the Natural Gas Act and Federal Power Act. While
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment could provide an alternate ground
for abrogation of state sovereign immunity, Congress has not, to this point,
utilized that power to exercise or delegate eminent domain power. While such an
abrogation of state sovereign immunity is doctrinally sound and theoretically
possible, it is difficult to imagine how state property could be taken using equal
protection powers.
Finally, it is important to note that sovereign immunity is not a simple matter
that could be cured by transforming a condemnation suit into one against a state
officer. Such suits seek to condemn state lands to which the state holds unsullied
title, and unless a state has already waived sovereign immunity to such suits, no
state officers could be viewed as acting outside of their statutory authority. And
for a private party to condemn state-owned land, the state would be a necessary
party. Condemnations suit against its officers, or other possessory owners, would
be insufficient to properly effectuate a takings.256
C. End Runs Around Sovereign Immunity
In the remainder of this Part, we explore potential theories that a private
plaintiff armed with delegated federal eminent domain power might deploy to
hale an unconsenting state into state or federal court without the state’s consent,
to condemn state land. First, we will analyze whether Congress may delegate its
own exception to state sovereign immunity to a private party and conclude that
Congress may not delegate such an exception. Next, we discuss whether
delegation of eminent domain authority could be self-executing such that it
inherently carries with it an abrogation of state sovereign immunity. There, we
explain why a delegation of eminent domain is not self-executing. Finally, we
examine whether a delegation of eminent domain power could allow a private
party to “stand in the shoes of the sovereign,” such that the private party takes
the place of the sovereign, similar to a qui tam suit. We find that these theories
are unsupported by the constitution, legal history, or current caselaw.

255. See, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32844, THE POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE:
LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER 1 (2014)
256. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218, 221 (1913) (“The
United States is the owner in possession of the vessel. It cannot be interfered with behind its
back and, as it cannot be made a party, this suit must fail.”).
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1. Takings as a Self-Executing Abrogation or Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity
Can the sovereign power of eminent domain function as a self-executing
abrogation of state sovereign immunity? As evident from the discussion of
inverse condemnation claims in Part III.C above, the Takings Clause is thought
to be a self-executing provision of the constitution, and no additional legislative
action is necessary to effectuate inverse takings claims.257 Yet, when the Takings
Clause collides with state sovereign immunity, every circuit to address some
version of that question—whether the normally self-executing Takings Clause
constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity—has answered that
question in the negative and dismissed the case. Some courts have gone further
than ruling on abrogation as self-executing. For example, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that an eminent domain provision of a state constitution
was not a waiver of state sovereign immunity.258 So what explains this?
One possibility is that the Takings Clause has external limits to its selfexecution. Fundamentally, the takings clause is a limitation on eminent domain
power and not a statement about the nature of the power. Thus, in contrast to
claims where state land has been taken, inverse condemnation claims are about
compensation for a state’s exercise of eminent domain power, not about the
condemnation power itself. For example, while no statutory cause of action may
be required in order to remedy a takings, whether the takings is effectuated
through eminent domain or a regulation that decreases property value, the
constitutional remedy provides the basis for an implied cause of action. However,
its self-execution is only viable when these actions would not otherwise run afoul
of other constitutional powers. Thus, where state sovereign immunity bars
actions without a state’s consent, the Takings Clause does not alter that sovereign
power.
Finally, it is worth pausing to consider that the inverse condemnation cases
may be qualitatively or normatively different from the situation presented here,
with regard to eminent domain, where a private party seeks to take state land
rather than draw from a state’s treasury. As noted in Part II.B.1 above, a major
justification for the push to ratify the Eleventh Amendment and reassert state
sovereign immunity was the concern that out-of-state creditors seeking to collect
on Revolutionary War bonds would bankrupt states, and that being haled into
federal court and forced to repay bonds was an affront to state dignity. In the
eminent domain situation, no state monies are at risk of leaving state coffers. But
money is still a form of property, and here, land and other property interests, such
257. See supra Part III.C.
258. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[E]ven if the provision
could possibly be construed as a waiver, a conclusion we do not reach, the provision is
certainly too ambiguous to satisfy the requirement that the provision be a clear statement of
Michigan’s ‘intention to subject itself to suit in federal court.’” (quoting Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985))).
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as easements, are at risk of being taken from the State’s assets by a federal court
without the state’s consent. Further, it is hard to imagine that the founders would
be unconcerned with private actors attempting to divest the state of property,
monetary or otherwise, without the state’s consent even if it was simply a
nonpossessory encumbrance.
Even if those who have advanced the argument that state sovereign
immunity is not—or should not be—a barrier to inverse condemnation claims
are correct,259 an easy answer is that this situation is distinct from an action where
a private party is seeking possession of state land through an eminent domain
action.
Another possible response to the distinction is to acknowledge the
justifications for the action are distinct, and while they involve the same
constitutional provisions, they are fundamentally different actions. Abrogation
of state sovereign immunity for inverse condemnation is rooted in a Fourteenth
Amendment equitable action, where the private party sues the state for a
constitutionally guaranteed remedy, which takes the form of damages. Further,
because the state would be acting unconstitutionally, the self-executing
abrogation of state sovereign immunity is nonetheless pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the action is a concrete and proportional remedy to the
unconstitutional action, as commanded by Fitzpatrick and City of Boerne. The
situation where a private actor delegated eminent domain power from the federal
government takes land from the state involves no “constitutional violation” such
as a failure to pay just compensation.260 Thus, while these situations provide for
a collision of the same doctrines, the doctrines play out in normatively and
analytically different ways. However, this understanding of inverse
condemnation would be contrary to the courts that have resolved the question by
finding that even those actions cannot abridge state sovereign immunity.261
While inverse takings claims superficially involve similar superconstitutional doctrines, another explanation for how they interact is that eminent
domain is not self-executing and therefore it cannot automatically defeat a claim
of sovereign immunity. As the Supreme Court recently confirmed in Knick v.
Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, the Takings Clause is self-executing.262
However, the power of eminent domain is not. Eminent domain derives
inherently from sovereignty, and has no textual basis in the constitution or laws
to be self-executing in and of itself.263 The Takings Clause, on the other hand, is
259. See Berger, supra note 215, at 493.
260. While this may run afoul of normal clear statement canons of federalism, it is
possible for the Court to understand this situation as unique since it is one of only two explicit
constitutional remedies. It is further complicated by the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
allows for suits against state officers for constitutional violations, does not abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
261. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
262. 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2172 (2019).
263. See supra Part II.A.1.
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a constitutional limitation on eminent domain as a sovereign power. And further,
the overriding meaning of self-executing in the context of inverse takings
caselaw involves timing (e.g., when injury accrues) or the nature of a claim
against the state (e.g., when state processes have been exhausted).
2. Delegation as an End Run Around Sovereign Immunity
Congress clearly can—and does—delegate its eminent domain power to
federal agencies and private parties as long as these delegations comply with the
generally broad limits on delegation. However, may Congress delegate the
federal government’s exception to state sovereign immunity, which enables the
federal government to instigate suit directly against states, to a private party? If
so, do any additional requirements, beyond those required by the nondelegation
doctrine, attach to the delegation? There is no definitive federal court precedent
addressing whether the federal government can delegate its ability to sue a state
in either federal or state court to a private party, what we will call a “sovereign
immunity exemption.” In short, allowing Congress to delegate the federal
government’s sovereign immunity exemption would effectively allow a private
entity to entirely circumvent a State’s sovereign immunity. In this Subpart, we
argue that delegation of the federal government’s sovereign immunity exception
aggrandizes federal power without political accountability. That would be akin
to delegating its very essence of its sovereignty, rather than a specific power.
The two most common elements by which legislative delegations are judged
involve the breadth of a delegation, i.e. whether it contains an intelligible
principle,264 and whether the delegation is an attempt to assert power through a
delegation which Congress could not do directly.265 The Court has struck down
congressional attempts to assert or delegate a power it did not have as an
aggrandizement of its power.266 As such, some powers simply may not be
264. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). Although
outside of the scope of this Article, who the intelligible principle is directed has been the
subject of healthy debate. Few statutes have been found to violate the intelligible principle.
Some cases recently heard by the Supreme Court may indicate that the Court is seeking to
revitalize and give teeth to the doctrine. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2123 (2019). As part of this potential effort by the Court, the present case could also be
determined as an impermissible delegation of federal power to a private party. Justice Alito
has long been an advocate for limiting the amount of power that the federal government can
delegate to private parties. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43,
55 (2015).
265. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (one house veto); Clinton v. New York,
524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998) (line-item veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986)
(comptroller general).
266. FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund 6 F.3d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (FEC’s ex
officio members), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726 (“Congress
cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976) (FEC composition). Cf. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878
(1991) (“separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally focuses on the danger of one branch’s
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delegated.
The federal government’s exception to state sovereign immunity inheres in
that sovereign and may not be delegated. Although one can imagine that an
intelligible principle could exist for a delegation of this exemption, such a
delegation is impermissible because it would allow Congress to accomplish
something indirectly that it could not do directly—namely, effectuating an
abrogation of state sovereign immunity using Article I powers. Thus, legislation
grounded in Article I powers, such as the Commerce Clause, cannot be the basis
for such a delegation because Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign
immunity directly using those powers.267 Any such delegation would be a clear
end run around the proscriptions of congressional power over states as
sovereigns.268 By contrast, Congress could theoretically delegate its exception
through statutory grants of the power passed pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it can abrogate state sovereign immunity using
these powers, if such delegation were to be permitted at all.
This all presumes that Congress believes it could delegate its sovereign
immunity exemption, and intends to do so. Supposing for a moment that such a
delegation were constitutionally permitted, it is worth restating that this would
still require Congress to meet clear statement rules, because a delegation would
alter the historic balance of federal-state powers. The Supreme Court has noted
that in the sovereign immunity context, legislative history is “irrelevant” to
determining whether state sovereign immunity has been abrogated.269 Instead,
“evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual.”270 It
therefore stands to reason that a delegation of the exception would also need to
be both unequivocal and textually based. A delegation would alter the historic
balance of federal-state powers, because it would allow a private party to sue an
unconsenting state in federal court, acting as the functional equivalent of an
aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch”).
267. This obviously does not include Bankruptcy, which is technically an Article I
power. Cf. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006); infra Part IV.C.3.
268. Cf. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir.
1999) (“[T]he United States cannot delegate to non-designated, private individuals its
sovereign ability to evade the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Only ‘responsible
federal officers,’ or those who act at their instance and under their control, may exercise the
authority of the United States as sovereign.”); United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech.
Inst., 173 F.3d 870, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“To assume that the United States possesses plenary
power to do what it will with its Eleventh Amendment exemption is to acknowledge that
Congress can make an end-run around the limits that the Amendment imposes on its legislative
choices.”), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000).
269. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (“Legislative history generally will be
irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment. If Congress’ intention is ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’
recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress’ intention is not unmistakably
clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule of Atascadero
will not be met.”).
270. Id.
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abrogation. Thus, an implied delegation, even if permissible in other contexts,271
would be impermissible here.
The delegation theory also presents other problems for which inherent
sovereign powers of the federal government may be delegated. If the delegation
of the federal government’s exception to sovereign immunity could be either
inherent or implicit in a delegation of eminent domain power, is it not also
necessarily the case that other attributes of sovereignty must attach? For
example, if the federal government’s state sovereign immunity exemption can be
delegated to private parties, can the federal government’s sovereign immunity
also be delegated to private parties?272 Would parties exercising eminent domain
also be immune from liability from torts or other statutory violations relating to
the condemnation or use of that land?
3. Party in Interest & Standing in the Shoes of the Sovereign
When a private party exercises the eminent domain power delegated to it by
the federal government, is that delegee acting in their own interest or in that of
the federal government? Although courts have understood assignees of federal
powers to “stand in the shoes” of the assignor in other contexts, this approach
has never been extended to sovereign immunity.273 This is precisely the case in
officer suits for official action, where, for the “purpose of sovereign immunity
‘individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they
represent.’”274 Traditionally, sovereign immunity does not solely apply to the
named parties in a suit, but rather, attaches to the true parties in interest.275
271. Unlike cooperative federalism statutes, which explicitly reference and incorporate
state roles, statutes discussing eminent domain, such as the Natural Gas Act, largely have no
textual reference to delegation and states.
272. An analogous situation proved too much for the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
1857. Tinsman v. Belvidere Del. R.R. Co., 26 N.J.L. 148, 170 (1857) (“These authorities . . .
maintain that corporations holding grants of public franchises are not only vested with the
sovereign right of eminent domain, but possess, also, the sovereign immunity against liability
for damages. If this be the law, then, wherever authority is granted by the legislature to a
private corporation or to an individual to construct a railroad, a canal, a turnpike, a bridge, a
raceway for manufacturing purposes, or any other work which the spirit of speculation may
prompt and the legislature may conceive will prove conducive to the public good, private
property may not only be taken against the will and consent of the owner upon making
compensation, but however ruinous in its consequences the work may be to individuals, no
redress can be had for damages resulting from their acts.”).
273. See, e.g., UMLIC VP LLC v. Matthias, 364 F.3d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 2004). It is also
briefly worth noting that the federal government can never stand in a private party’s shoes.
Young v. United States, 71 F.3d 1238, 1244 (6th Cir. 1995) (“As a sovereign, it is impossible
for the United States ever to stand precisely in the shoes of a private person.”).
274. S.J. v. Hamilton Cnty., 374 F.3d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Alkire, 330 F.3d
at 811).
275. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)
(sovereign immunity attaches to “arm[s] of the state”); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College,
519 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1975) (sovereign immunity only attaches where an entity “stands
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Another way to understand state sovereign immunity could be to only allow
parties to have the power to assert sovereign immunity if the named party was
the state or an arm of the state. This, then, requires a court to discern the true
party in interest. It’s clear that for sovereign immunity purposes, arms of the state
and state officers acting legally within their official capacity are both understood
as the state itself.276
The Supreme Court has confronted the issue of how to resolve state
sovereign immunity questions in in rem suits in two additional contexts relevant
to this discussion: admiralty and bankruptcy. And, in United States v. Carmack,
the Supreme Court described in a footnote that a “general authorization” carries
with it the “sovereign’s full powers except such as are excluded expressly or by
necessary implication.”277 However, eminent domain power is different when
exercised by the sovereign itself, and is changed by the nature of its delegation
to other entities, such as public utilities.278 In this Subpart, we analyze whether
the delegation of the federal government’s eminent domain power could allow
the delegee the additional power to “stand in the shoes” of the government, and
therefore claim the federal government’s sovereign immunity exemption.
a.

Bankruptcy’s Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity

While it is still true that states may assert sovereign immunity as a defense
in cases in which a state, or an arm of the state, owns a portion of the res for an
in rem case, the Court held in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz that
the Bankruptcy Clause in Article I was a self-executing abrogation of state
sovereign immunity.279 In Katz, acting as an arm of the state, a public college
argued it was entitled to sovereign immunity in a bankruptcy suit against trustees
seeking recovery of preferential transfers from a bankrupt debtor’s estate.280 The
opinion, written by Justice Stevens, largely rested on the notion that bankruptcy
proceedings are in rem, and therefore “d[id] not implicate States’ sovereignty to
nearly the same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction.”281 Congress has the
“power to establish ‘uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States,’”282 and therefore, has the subsidiary power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in order to make uniform laws. Further, from an originalist

in the shoes of the state itself”).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (officer suits); Will v.
Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (arm of the state).
277. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.13 (1946).
278. Id.
279. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 4.
280. Id. at 361.
281. Id. at 362 (citing Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U. S. 440, 450-51
(2004)).
282. Id. at 370 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 4).
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perspective, Stevens reasoned that a nineteenth century understanding of the
Bankruptcy Clause did not contravene state sovereign immunity.283 Thus,
weighing the interests in a sort of balancing test, these together, combined with
what the majority understood as a minimal infringement on sovereignty to hale
states into court for the limited purpose of adjudicating bankruptcy claims, left
little reason to deny federal jurisdiction over states where there was a strong
federal interest and textual commitment.284 The Court’s holding in Katz
explicitly did not alter the Court’s understanding of Congress’ ability to abrogate,
especially with respect to the Commerce Clause.285 More recently, in Tennessee
Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood, the Court reaffirmed Katz, holding that
it did not infringe on a state’s sovereignty for a bankruptcy court to exercise
jurisdiction to discharge a debt.286
Interpreting Katz, several circuit courts have confronted these bankruptcy
questions, with varying results. For example, the Second Circuit in Ace Am. Ins.
Co. v. DPH Holdings Corp. (In re DPH Holdings Corp.) rejected a state’s
sovereign immunity defense in a bankruptcy proceeding, understanding the
Bankruptcy Clause to have been a blanket waiver of state sovereign immunity,
limited to the bankruptcy context.287 Moreover, in Allen v. Cooper, discussed
above in Part II.B.2, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Bankruptcy Clause
stands apart in its self-executing abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Additionally, while sovereign immunity is not evaluated using a balancing
test, even if a court were tasked with balancing the interests of the parties, the
relevant considerations would pair state interests in core concerns to its
sovereignty—the ability to be forced to litigate by a private litigant in federal
court without its consent and control its real property “unsullied” by tort, using
Louis Jaffe’s descriptor, against the private interests in participating in a federal
regulatory program.

283. Id. at 375-77.
284. In 1787, the Bankruptcy Clause was included in the Constitution with the
background that debtors could be imprisoned by states. In Katz, the Court relied in part on the
relationship of “discharging a debt” to habeas corpus. Id. at 374-77. The Bankruptcy Act of
1800 specifically granted federal courts habeas authority to release debtors from state prisons
without sovereign immunity objections. The Court viewed this history as allowing the
abrogation of sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy context. Id.
285. Id. at 369 n.9 (“Of course, the Bankruptcy Clause, located as it is in Article I, is
‘intimately connected’ . . . with the Commerce Clause . . . the Bankruptcy Clause’s unique
history, combined with the singular nature of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction, . . . [mean] the
ratification of the Bankruptcy Clause does represent a surrender by the States of their
sovereign immunity in certain federal proceedings.”).
286. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U. S. 440, 448-49, 451 (2004)
(balancing hardship of not granting jurisdiction with the potential infringement on state
sovereignty).
287. Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. DPH Holdings Corp., 448 Fed. Appx. 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2011)
(bankruptcy is “a narrow jurisdiction that does not implicate state sovereignty to nearly the
same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction.” (quoting Katz, 546 U.S. at 378)).
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b. Qui Tam Actions as Analogs
In a qui tam action, a private party brings suit on the government’s behalf.
The government is considered the real plaintiff while the private party, called a
relator, sues in the name of the government.288 Generally, the relator in a
successful qui tam action receives a percentage of the money owed to the
government. The False Claims Act (“FCA”), originally passed during the Civil
War, is possibly the most prominent example of federal qui tam actions.289 “FCA
establishes a scheme that permits either the Attorney General or a private party
to initiate a civil action alleging fraud on the Government. A private enforcement
action under the FCA is called a qui tam action. In this scheme, private parties
are enforcing governmental rights. When a relator initiates an action, the United
States is given 60 days to review the claim and decide whether it will “elect to
intervene and proceed with the action.”290
Some have argued that a federal delegation of eminent domain power allows
private parties to stand in the shoes of the sovereign, using qui tam actions as
either a proposed model or an analogy.291 But for a private party to sue a state
sovereign, even through a qui tam suit in the name of the federal government,
the statutory basis for the suit must nonetheless permit suit against the state.292
As such, these suits are still subject to the same clear statement rules of
federalism that any abrogation of state sovereign immunity would have to meet.
For example, when Court analyzed the FCA in Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, it began with the question of whether
there was a statutory basis to allow the private party to sue a state agency. There,
a private plaintiff initiated a qui tam action in the name of the federal government
against an arm of the state of Vermont.293 After the federal government declined
to intervene in the suit, the state agency moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity
grounds. Although the False Claims Act created liability for “any person,” the
Court determined that in the case of Stevens, it did not subject states to liability
288. E.g., United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“The qui tam relator brings the action on behalf of the federal government. The relator stands
in the government’s shoes—in neither a better nor worse position than the government stands
when it brings suit.”).
289. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.
290. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 930 (2009)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)).
291. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FERC OPEN MEETING JANUARY 30, 2020,
FERC LIVE VIDEO & AUDIO WEBCASTS AND ARCHIVES (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/7KQE-9MFQ.
292. FERC has on several occasions acknowledged that the agency lacks federal
authorization to condemn land itself, and suits brought by private certificate holders to
condemn lands for pipelines under the Natural Gas Act are not brought in the name of the
commission. Order on Petition for Declaratory Order, PennEast Pipeline Co., 170 FERC
¶ 61,064, at P 49 (Jan. 30, 2020).
293. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787
(2000).
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in private suits, because of the “longstanding interpretive presumption that
‘person’ does not include the sovereign.”294 Thus, without any further textual
indication that Congress intended to create liability for states, the Court held that
a private party could not bring suit against a state. Further, in dicta, the Court
expressed “serious doubt” that a private party acting as a federal qui tam relator
could bring suit against a State.295
Similarly, in Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, the Court
discussed whether a statute could incidentally abrogate state sovereign
immunity, commenting that, in the case at hand, “[t]he notion that federal tolling
of a state limitations period constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity
as to claims against state defendants at least raises a serious constitutional
doubt.”296 There, plaintiffs filed both an Age Discrimination in Employment Act
claim and pendant state law discrimination claims against the University of
Minnesota in federal court. The university, as an arm of the state, successfully
moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. Plaintiffs, upon refiling in
state court, argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
tolled their claims. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Minnesota
Supreme Court that dismissal on state sovereign immunity grounds did not toll
the claims because the statute did not purport to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
Several circuits have also tackled the same question: whether the real party
in interest in a qui tam action is the relator or the federal government. In United
States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., a relator
brought a False Claims Act claim against a state university hospital, and the
federal government declined to intervene.297 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
allowed the case to proceed despite the University’s sovereign immunity defense
because, even though an unconsenting state was litigating against a suit brought
by a private plaintiff, the federal government was the “real party in interest.” The
Fourth Circuit unquestioningly accepted that states enjoyed immunity against
suits by private parties, and that states waived sovereign immunity against suit
by the federal government.298 Thus, according to the Milam court, the question
was, “simply stated: is this a suit by the United States?”299 Answering in the
affirmative, the court held that the real party in interest was the federal

294. Id. at 780.
295. Id. at 787 (“We of course express no view on the question whether an action in
federal court by a qui tam relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment,
but we note that there is ‘a serious doubt’ on that score.” (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
296. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 534 (2002).
297. United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d
46, 47 (4th Cir. 1992).
298. Id. at 48 (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); and West
Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 (1987)).
299. Id.
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government, and state sovereign immunity simply did not apply.300
By contrast, in United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech University, a
plaintiff brought a qui tam action against Texas Tech for alleged False Claims
Act violations.301 The district court, relying on the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in
Milam, dismissed the state’s sovereign immunity defense because qui tam
actions are in the name of the federal government, not private plaintiffs, such that
the Eleventh Amendment did not apply.302 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed
and dismissed the case, holding that Texas Tech was entitled to assert sovereign
immunity against the private plaintiff. Using Seminole Tribe as a benchmark for
its analysis, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the statutory basis for the qui tam
action had (1) ”unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity;” and
(2) ”whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power.’”303
Interpreting Blatchford, the court noted that the Eleventh Amendment was
jurisdictional in nature, preventing federal courts from hearing any claim brought
by a private party against an unconsenting state where sovereign immunity had
not been abrogated.304 Thus, for the Fifth Circuit, the court lacked jurisdiction to
even determine if the False Claims Act had created a cause of action to be
brought against the state.
However, the Foulds court seemed to struggle with the question, and found
it difficult to properly square qui tam actions against states with an analog.305
First, the Fifth Circuit looked at cases where the federal government had assigned
cases to a private plaintiff, who then tried to assert a claim against state actors.306
The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that, in the context of qui tam actions,
“the United States cannot delegate to non-designated, private individuals its
sovereign ability to evade the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. “Only
‘responsible federal officers,’ or those who act at their instance and under their
control, may exercise the authority of the United States as sovereign.”307
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held in Jachetta v. United States that sovereign
immunity barred several qui tam claims where a private party attempted to assert
what the plaintiff argued was the federal government’s pecuniary interest.308
300. Id. at 50.
301. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
302. Id. at 284 (citing United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 980 F. Supp. 864,
870 (N.D. Tex. 1997)).
303. Id. at 294 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
304. Id. at 291-92 (“The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that Congress cannot
delegate to private citizens the United States’ sovereign exemption from Eleventh Amendment
restrictions.”). The Fifth Circuit only described the Eleventh Amendment in the federal
context, likely in part because it was decided before Alden.
305. Id. at 289-90 (“The question allows no easy answer. One reason for the perplexity
is that Congress has not, in this respect, specified the contours of the relationship between the
qui tam plaintiff and the United States.”).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 294.
308. Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 912 (9th Cir. 2011).
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There, a plaintiff brought a series of claims against both the Bureau of Land
Management and the state of Alaska in a land dispute. Nonetheless, the Jachetta
court rejected the argument that the federal government could authorize a private
plaintiff to sue on its behalf. In sum, several courts have understood qui tam
actions where the government declines to assert its own interest, leaving the suit
in the control of the relator, as only nominally in the name of the government.
Thus such actions are not functional analogs as they do not invoke the same
governmental interests nor rights.
CONCLUSION
The founders did not craft the Constitution in isolation, but against the
backdrop of countless legal traditions and norms, many of which were formally
codified within the document. Two of these, eminent domain and state sovereign
immunity, both inherent in sovereignty, existed prior to ratification of the
Constitution, and their contours were in part limited or bolstered by the Fifth and
Eleventh Amendments, respectively. Recognizing this history and legal function,
this Article has argued that laws delegating federal eminent domain power to
private parties do not, and should not, confer with it the separate power of
bringing suit in federal or state courts against states without state consent. As
described above, private delegations suffer from lack of accountability. This
paper is certainly not meant to suggest that private delegations are improper, that
land should not be condemned, or that sovereign immunity is immutable. It is
only meant to illustrate how sovereign immunity and eminent domain are
separate powers of sovereignty that are not interconnected.
In each private delegation where the extent of the delegation is either
undefined or does not limit the power against state real property, this Article
concludes that Congress has granted a right without a remedy; that Congress
perhaps meant to allow the private party to take state land, and where a state
allows that taking to occur, it may be effectuated in the courts. This may well be
an unsatisfying resolution for Congress to widely grant rights to private parties
through delegation of its own powers, but for them to be unenforceable at the
margins. Yet, this is not a new phenomenon, and happens frequently in the
context of congressionally established private rights.309 This analysis may also
bear on the foundational question of whether or not the federal government has
any source of constitutional authority to directly condemn state land without the

309. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 55-56 (1996) (sovereign immunity
precludes suit against state); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 151 (1908) (sovereign immunity
precludes damages actions against state officials); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center,
575 U.S. 320, 324-27 (2015) (whether a plaintiff has a federal right is a separate and distinct
question from whether a cause of action to enforce that right is available); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (plaintiff only entitled to prospective, not retrospective relief); Sierra
Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 697 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Congress may, of course, limit a court’s
equitable power to enjoin acts violating federal law.”).
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state’s consent. While the Supreme Court has previously opined on this
question,310 this Article raises the specter that its previous reasoning may no
longer survive. However, it is abundantly clear that a private party may not take
from an unconsenting state.

310. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941)
(allowing a federal taking of state land).

